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The United States' Legislative Response to the 
Third United Nations Conference on the 
Law of the Sea Deadlock 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Informal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT)' of the United Nations 
Law of the Sea Conference2 is unique from the perspective of international 
law. It is at once both lex specialis and lex generalis. Articles 133 to 192 of the 
1. 8 U.N. CLOSOR 1, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/WP. 10 (1977) [hereinafter cited as ICNT]. 
2. Concern for the peaceful uses of the seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction by the 
United Nations was first included on the agenda of the General Assembly in 1967 at the initiative 
of the representative from Malta. The examination of this item resulted in the adoption of 
Resolution 234-0 (XXII) which called for the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee. G.A. Res. 
234-0,22 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) H, U.N. Doc. Al6716 (1968). The Committee was 
assigned the task of studying the peaceful uses of the seabed and the ocean floor beyond the limits 
of national jurisdiction. Subsequent to the report of the Ad Hoc Committee to the General 
Assembly at its 23rd session, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 24-67 (XXIII) which 
established the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the 
Limits of National Jurisdiction on December 21,1968. G.A.Res. 24-67, 23 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 
(No. 18) 15, U.N. Doc. Al7218 (1969). In December 1970 the General Assembly adopted two 
important resolutions. Resolution 274-9 (XXV) caiied for an international regime to manage the 
seabed for the "common heritage of mankind" and reiterated a,moratorium on the exploitation 
of the seabed until such a body was established. G.A.Res. 274-9, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 
24-, U.N. Doc. Al8028 (1971). Under Part C of Resolution 2750 (XXV) the new Law of the Sea 
Conference was scheduled to be convened in 1973. G.A.Res. 2750,25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 
28) 26, U.N. Doc. Al8028 (1971). The Committee was instructed under the provisions of this 
resolution to begin the preparatory work for the Conference. The Conference was assigned the 
following areas of concern: 
1) the establishment of an equitable international regime (including international 
machinery) for the area and the resources of the seabed and the ocean floor beyond 
the limits of national jurisdiction; 
2) a precise definition of the area; 
3) a regime of the high seas; 
4-) a regime of the continental shelf; 
5) a regime of the territorial sea, in particular its breadth and the question of inter-
national straits. 
6) regime for the contiguous zone; 
7) fi'hing and the conservation of the living resources of the high seas; 
8) preservation of the marine environment; 
9) promotion of scientific research and its transfer to those states less technologically 
developed. 
/d. The Committee met in Geneva and New York from 1969 through 1970 and submitted a final 
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report which contained a comprehensive review and documentation of its work. 28 U. N. GAOR, 
Supp. (No. 21), U.N. Doc. Al9021 (1974). 
Resolution 3067 (XXVIII), dated November 16, 1973, declared that the first session of the 
Law of the Sea Conference would be convened in New York from December 3,1973 to December 
14, 1973; this preparatory session was to be for organizational matters, the establishment ofsub-
sidiary organs, the allocation of work to those organs, and other procedural matters. G.A. Res. 
3067 (XXVIII), 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 13, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1974). Under 
paragraph 3 of this resolution the General Assembly stated that the mandate of the Conference: 
Shall be to adopt a convention dealing with all matters relative to the law ofthe sea, tak-
ing into account the subject matter listed in paragraph 2 of the General Assembly 
resolution 2750 (XXV) and the list of issues relating to the law of the sea formally ap-
proved on August 18, 1972 by the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and 
the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction and bearing in mind that 
the problems of ocean space are closely interrelated and need to be considered as a 
whole. 
The General Assembly further decided that the second session for the purpose of beginning the 
substantive work would convene for a period often weeks from June 20, 1974 to August 29, 1974 
at Caracas. Any future sessions, if necessary, might be scheduled by the Conference. This resolu-
tion invited the Conference to make arrangements for the Session and referred to it all relevant 
documentation of the General Assembly and the Seabed Committee. Id. 
At the first session in New York held in December 1973, the Draft Rules of Procedure for the 
Conference was drawn up, 3 U.N. CLOSOR 67, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/L.l (1974). It was 
decided that a quorum for the purpose of declaring a meeting open for debate was one-third of the 
states attending. For the purpose of making decisions a simple majority of the states must be pre-
sent. Each state at the Conference was assigned one vote. Conference decisions on matters of 
substance required approval by two-thirds of the states present and voting. Decisions on matters 
of procedure would be by a majority of states present and voting. The President of the Con-
ference was given the authority to decide the nature of a vote if conflict arose regarding the pro-
cedural or substantive nature of a vote. During the course of the first and second sessions it was 
decided that the work of the Conference would be allotted to three main subcommittees. At the 
outset of the third session, which was held in Geneva from March 17 to May 9, 1975, it was 
decided that it would be a negotiating session with few formal discussions or debates. The prin-
cipal result of the third session was the preparation of three single informal negotiating texts 
covering all the work before the Conference. These texts correspond to the tasks assigned to the 
three committees and were prepared by the Chairmen thereof. They do not necessarily represent 
consensus or agreement but were to function as the basis for negotiations at the fourth session. 
These texts represent the judgment of the respective chairmen as to what would represent ap-
propriate starting points for discussion at the fourth session, which commenced on March 15, 
1976 in New York. 
These texts are collectively referred to as the Single Negotiating Text (SNT) 4 U.N. CLOSOR 
137, U.N. Doc. AlConf. 62/WP. 8/Part I (1975) [hereinafter cited as SNT). Copies of the SNT 
were distributed on the last day of the third session hence they were not subject to debate or 
discussion in that forum. The Fourth Session was held at the United Nations in New York in the 
Spring of 1976. It produced a revised version of the SNT which is referred to as the Revised 
Single Negotiating Text, 5 U.N. CLOSOR 125, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/WP. 8/Rev. 1, (1976) 
[hereinafter cited as RSNT); see Oxman, The Third United Nations Conjerence on Ihe Law oj Ihe Sea: 
The 1976 New York Sessions, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 247 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Oxman). The 
United States characterized this text as the basis for further negotiations but not wholly accept-
able in its present form. In the summer of 1976 the Fifth Session was held in New York. No new 
negotiating text was prepared as a result of a deadlock on ocean mining and other issues. At the 
Sixth Session, which was held in New York in 1977, the Informal Composite Negotiating Text 
(ICNT) was produced. This Text reorganized all of the material of the earlier texts into a com-
prehensive draft treaty albeit with certain fundamental and substantive changes. ICNT, supra 
note 1. The ICNT was termed as "fundamentally unacceptable" by U.S. Ambassador to the 
Law of the Sea Conference Richardson at the conclusion of the Sixth Session. U.S. LOS Delega-
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Text3 have the potential to embody and to implement the contemporary no-
tion of need as the basis for international aid, i.e., an international law of 
global welfare recognition. Such a recognition is based on the conceptualiza-
tion of the "common heritage of mankind" in the specific instance of the sea-
bed exploitation questions and the special recognition of the lesser developed 
countries (LDCs) as a special group entitled to and requiring privileges 
relative to the developed countries (DCs) in a more general context. Such a 
realization requires a legal structure that reflects these new concepts and 
assists in their development. In Articles 133 to 1924 ofthe Text one can see the 
rudiments of such a structure. 
In addition to the conclusion that it is in the immediate interests of the 
LDCs to get as strong an international authority as possible to preside over 
deep seabed exploitation, the fact stands out that the prime objective of this 
group at the current session of the Conference should be the conclusion of an 
agreement, since any accord is better than none from their perspective. As will 
be explained below, 5 if agreement is not reached, the ensuing circumstances 
may vest interests and prohibit an agreement in the future. 
It should be stated at the outset that it is also in the interests of the DCs to 
seek agreement at this session. From the perspective of long term global 
stability, the whole can only be as strong as its weakest links. The notion ex-
pressed in the "Philadelphia Declaration" of the International Labor 
Organization, that "poverty anywhere is a danger to prosperity 
everywhere,"6 is but one expression of this reality. In the event of exploitation 
of the seabed unilaterally by those developed States possessing the technology 
and the capital to do so, the gap between the rich and the poor certainly can be 
expected to widen. In the absence of an international agreement, unilateral 
exploitation will be unavoidable. Hence, agreement is important from a prac-
tical perspective. From a legal, philosophical point of view, it is important 
tion, Report on the Resumed Seventh Session of the Third United Nations Conference on the 
Law of the Sea, New York, Aug. 21 - Sept. 15, 1978 (copy on file in Boston College International and 
Comparative Law Review offices.) 
The Seventh Session of the Third U.N. Law of the Sea Conference was resumed in New York 
on August 21st and concluded on September 15th of 1978. This session followed an intersessional 
meeting that was held in Geneva in March, 1978. Work began immediately where the negotia-
tions had ended in Geneva with no procedural or reorganizational debate. All seven negotiating 
groups met but little progress was made toward resolving the disputes over the deep seabed min-
ing disputes between the industrialized nations and the Group of 77 (now some 119 nations). The 
Conference decided to meet again for six weeks in Geneva beginning on March 19, 1979. A sec-
ond session in 1979 late in the summer of 1979 was mentioned as a distinct possibility. The goal 
of this session would be to revise the ICNT and consider the "formalization" of the text. 
3. ICNT, supra note 1, arts. 133-192, formerly Part I of the Single Negotiating Text, supra 
note 2. 
4. ICNT, supra note 1, arts. 133-192. 
5. See text accompanying notes 85-126 infra. 
6. W.D. VERWEY, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 339 (1972); 
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because it allows mankind the opportunity for a unique social experiment vir-
tually unparalleled in contemporary history. The establishment of an interna-
tional authority allows the function of international law and organization to be 
real, visible and immediate in the pursuit of a relatively apolitical goal. 
This Comment will outline briefly the problem that exists concerning the 
International Authority. 7 Initially, it will examine the International Authority 
as it is presently structured in order to provide an exposition of what the con-
flicts are. This examination of the structure of the Authority is a necessary pre-
requisite to a perception of the overall picture of conflict. Secondly, the author 
will illustrate some of the previous points of conflict that provoked legislation 
in 1973-1974 and the importance of a quid pro quo in the context of a package 
deal. 8 Thirdly, and most importantly, this Comment will examine in detail the 
7. This Comment will deal with articles 133-192 of the ICNT, supra note 1, formerly Part I of 
the SNT, supra note 2, which corresponds to the work ofthe First Committee. The First Commit-
tee has been assigned the task of establishing a regime and machinery to deal with the exploita-
tion of the seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. 
As regards the establishment of international machinery, which will be the focus of this paper, 
two main problems can be discerned. One concerns who is to do the actual exploitation of the 
seabed, i.e., States parties, juridical entities possessing the nationality of a State, nationals of 
States parties, or the International Authority itself. This issue and the four basic positions ad-
vanced are fully explained and differentiated in Adede, The System for Exploitation of the "Common 
Heritage of Mankind" at the Caracas Conference, 69 AM.]. INT'L L. 31 (1975). The issue has been 
largely resolved in terms of the "two areas" system. The "two areas" system means that in sub-
mitting bids and sites to the International Authority, firms would provide pairs of alternative sites 
of approximate equal size and value. The Authority would select one of these for its own exploi-
tation or sub-contracting thereof. This would be done under the aegis of the Enterprise, one of 
the organs ofthe Authority. The other site would go to the firm submitting the alternative pairs of 
sites. ICNT, supra note 1, art. 169. This solution represented the broadest base of compromise on 
the question of who shall exploit. It does, however, effectively deny the Authority a monopoly on 
exploitation. 
The second issue concerns the structure of the proposed International Authority and the degree 
of its powers. While the framework of the Authority and its subsidiary organs has basically been 
agreed upon, a great deal of conflict remains over the voting system, internal distribution of 
power among the organs, and the actual extent of the power of the Authority. Because the various 
aspects of the Conference are being considered in terms of a •• package deal" to encourage trade-
offs and compromises on the wide range of issues, it is important to look at the structure of the 
Authority and its powers and voting procedures to better understand the points of conflict be-
tween the major positions and to foresee possible resolutions of conflicting positions in terms of 
quid pro quo in these areas. See generally Oxman, supra note 2; Stevenson & Oxman, Preparationsfor 
the Law of the Sea Conference, 68 AM.]. INT'L L. 1 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Stevenson & Oxman]; 
Stevenson & Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The 1975 Geneva Ses-
sion, 69 AM.]. INT'L L. 763 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Geneva Session]; Stevenson & Oxman, The 
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Law of the Sea: The 1974 Caracas Session; 69 AM .]. 
INT'L L. 1 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Caracas Session]. Within this context one of the most con-
troversial areas has been the extent of the implications of deep seabed exploitation and means of 
dealing with them; in other words, what is at stake. 
8. In reiterating the importance of the "package deal" concept and the need for a wide range 
of mutual concessions to be made by the parties concerned, three categories of examples can be 
enumerated. The first was suggested by Professor Gardner. Gardner, Offshore Oil and the Law of the 
Seas, N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1976, § 3, at 14E. col. 2 [hereinafter cited as Gardner]. He pointed 
out two possible tradeoffs pertaining to the acceptance of revenue-sharing by the industrialized 
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unilateral action being debated in the United States. As the LOS Conference 
negotiators continue to fail to arrive at an agreed upon international system, 
the Congress is being pushed by mining consorita9 towards implementing a 
nations from either 200 meters or 12 miles seaward. On the one hand "acceptance of revenue-
sharing could be traded for international endorsement of coastal state jurisdiction over seabed 
resources to 200 miles and to the edge of the continental margin where it exceeds that distance." 
Id. The other possible tradeoff is that "the revenue-sharing proposal could be used to persuade 
these countries to accept a compromise giving industrialized nations reasonable terms of access to 
deep sea minerals and reasonable security of investment for their ocean mining enterprises." /d. 
It is the author's view that this first category of quid pro quo exchanges involves a trade of the 
policy orientation of the Authority, i.e., revenue-sharing, for a matter of the delimitation of 
coastal State jurisdiction. Also included in this category is the "Kissinger exchange" of produc-
tion controls for the rights of free transit in international straits and navigation in the 200 mile 
economic zone. 
The second category of quid pro quo exchanges involves compromise within the terms of the ac-
tual structural composition of the Authority and the voting procedure of its component organs. 
Numerous examples can be cited here. The LDCs might concede to a relatively weaker Authority 
if they had the potential to dominate its decisions and policy. On the other hand, the United 
States might concede to a strong Authority (as it presently exists in the text) if its interests were 
better represented within it. In either case the tradeoff occurs between the overall power of the 
Authority and the balance of power within it. This is one of the reasons that the earlier exposition 
of the Authority and its component organs is important. 
A third category of possible tradeoffs exists between the two categories defined, i. e., between 
some aspect of the structure of the Authority and, for example, the issue of the extension of na-
tional jurisdiction to the edge of the continental margin beyond 200 miles. The United States 
might agree to a stronger Authority or a system of equal voting if the area under the jurisdiction 
of the Authority was smaller. 
The possibility of these types of exchanges is significant and underlines the importance of the 
"package deal" concept. When a deadlock is reached within a narrow category of compromise, 
the attempt for resolution can be expanded to a broader range of negotiating points. The problem 
begins when minimum demands are treated as maximum concessions and vice versa. By expand-
ing the arena of negotiations, the likelihood of agreement is increased. In the context of the power 
of the Authority and the distribution of power within it, when consensus breaks down in this 
specific realm it can be sought by respective concessions in other areas of the negotiations. 
9. Congress has recognized that American firms and consortia involved in the development of 
technology for deep seabed mining have invested huge sums of money. In the absence of an inter-
national legal framework providing for a system oflicenses and permits they are hesitant to make 
additional outlays. On the problem of risk of investment and exclusive rights as distinct from 
political risk see Burton, Freedom of the Seas: IntertllltiotllJl Law Applicabk to Deep Seabed Mining Claims, 
29 STAN. L. REV. 1135, 1143-44 (1977); Note, Murky Wa/e1"s: Private Claims to Deep Ocean Seabed 
Minerals, 7 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1237 (1975). The following chart illustrates those consortia 
involved: 
OCEAN MINING CONSORTIA AND JOINT VENTURES 
% Ownership of 
Effective 
Names of Companies Interest Country 
Kennecott Consortium: 
Kennecott Copper Corp .................. . 50 United States 
British Petroleum Co .................... . 10 Great Britain 
Rio Tinto Zinc Corp., Ltd ................ . 10 Do. 
Consolidated Gold Fields, Ltd ............. . 10 Do. 
Noranda Mines, Ltd. . .................. . 10 Canada 
Mitsubishi Corp ........................ . 10 Japan 
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unilateral national system. The author will conclude with a discussion of the 
importance of an overall international agreement lO and the likely impact of a 
unilateral response by the United States. 
Ocean Management, Inc.: 
Inco, Ltd .............................. . 
Arbeitsgemeinschaft Meerestechnische 
gewinnbare Rohstoffe (AMR) .......... . 
Sedco, Inc ............................. . 
Deep Ocean Mining Co. (DOMCO) ....... . 
Ocean Mining Association (Service Contractor: 
Deepsea Ventures, Inc.): 
United States Steel Corp ................. . 
Union Minere, S.A. . ................... . 
Sun Oil Co ............................ . 








Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. ............ 40 
Standard Oil ofIndiana. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 
Canada 







Royal Dutch Shell. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Netherlands 
Bos Kalis Westminster.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 10 France 
French Association for Nodule Exploration: France 
Centre National pour I'Exploitation des 
Oceans (CNEXO) .................... . 
Comissarial a I'Energie Atomique (CEA). 
Bureau de Recherche Geologiques et 
Miniers (BRGM) ..................... . 
Societe Metallurgique Nouvelle/Societe 
Le Nickel (SMN/SLN) ................ . 
Chartiers de France Dunkerque ........... . 
Continuous Line Bucket (CLB) Group: About 20 Various 
companies in 6 countries including Australia, 
Canada, France, Federal Republic of Ger-
many, japan, and the United States Consort-
ium for development of mining system but not 
commercialization ...................... . 
DOMA: A group of34japanese companies .... japan 
SOURCE: Hearings, infra note 83, at 65-66. 
10. The major issues regarding the agreement emerging in the Conference relates to the extent 
of the adversity of the economic implications of the exploitations of the mineral resources of the 
deep seabed and the proposed mechanisms for minimizing the possible adverse effects on the 
LDCs. 3 U.N. CLOSOR 4, U.N. Doc. AlConf. 62/25 (1974). The mineral resources at the heart 
of the issue are the so-called" manganese nodules." These nodules are dark, shiny rocks approx-
imately the size of a fist. It is estimated that approximately 30% of the dry weight of the nodules 
would represent recoverable metal content. The metals that could be recovered are manganese 
(24%), nickel (1.6%), copper (1.4%), cobalt (.21 %) and trace minerals (.3%). /d .. 
It is essential to point out that the proportion of these metals in the nodules doesn't correspond 
to the overall global supply and demand patterns. The potential magnitude of the manganese 
nodule supply is astounding. Only a minute fraction (3 %) of the ocean floor could supply the an-
nual demand for these minerals except copper. In addition, it has been estimated that although it 
takes thousands of years for a nodule to be formed, they are continuously being formed at a rate 
that exceeds the present consumption of these metals. Report of the Secretary-General, 26 U.N. 
GAOR, Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed 26, U.N. Doc. AlAC. 138/36 (1971) 
[hereinafter cited as 1971 Report]. Admittedly, only a small percentage may be commercially 
recoverable, but they nonetheless represent a vast potential source. Since any exploitation of 
these nodules will represent a totally new input to present supply patterns, it has been assumed 
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II. STRUCTURE OF THE AUTHORITY 
Articles 150 and 151 of the leNTil set out in general the nature and fun-
damental principles of the functions and operations of the proposed Authority. 
The International Authority will be an organization through which States that 
that the impact will have a depressing effect upon the prices of these minerals. This depression in 
prices would have particularly severe consequences for LOC producers for several reasons. 
Firstly, while the share of the LOCs in world production of certain minerals has been decreas-
ing, due to increased production for export by developed countries, the dependence of the LOCs 
on mineral exports for government revenues has been increasing. Secondly, it would alter the 
flow of private investment from the LOCs to deep sea mining activities. Simultaneously, seabed 
exploitation would divert the development of technological refining and extraction methods 
toward the direct processing types applicable to seabed extraction. Finally, the inability of the 
LOCs to participate directly in seabed exploitation could have a further negative impact in terms 
of the increasing gap between the rich and the poor. This inability to participate is precipitated by 
technological and fmancial impediments. See Kaldor, SlIJbilizing the Terms of Trade of Underdeveloped 
Countries, 8 EcON. BULL. LATIN AM. (1963) (which discusses the notion that the benefit of 
technological progress in manufacturing are retained by the producers, but benefits of 
technological progress in primary extractive production are passed on to the consumers). 
Since aggregate demand for many of these minerals is not very responsive to an increase in 
price, the output from the seabed would tend to displace marginal land production. This effect 
would be exacerbated by the factors mentioned above, i.e., restrictive efforts on land-based pro-
duction because of its diminished profitability and the accompanying alteration in the flow of in-
vestment. It should be kept in mind that with any reference to price elasticity (or the degree of de-
mand responsiveness to price changes) is affected by the availability of substitutes when prices in-
crease. Conversely attention must be directed at the possibilities of using the minerals for other 
purposes if prices decrease and the ensuing consumption in greater quantities than under tradi-
tional supply and demand schedules. 
One mitigating effect upon the detrimental consequences for LOC producers is that world de-
mand for these minerals is expected to increase at approximately 5% per annum. However, this 
utilization of increased supply hardly seems adequate when one looks closely at production 
possibilities from this as yet untapped source. It has been estimated by the United Nation's 
Secretariat that one deep sea mining operation by 1980 might supply from .13% to 7.9% of 
world demand of the four major metals recoverable from the nodules. 1971 Report, supra, at 56, 
table XVIII. 
Numerous studies have been prepared by UNCTAO, ECOSOC, and the United Nation's 
Secretariat attempting to identify the problems associated with the production of these minerals 
from the seabed. See notes 54-58 infra. These problems have been approached from the perspec-
tive of the anticipated scale of seabed production relative to the global supply and demand pat-
terns. These studies have not been in total agreement with one another in terms of the anticipated 
impact upon the LOC producers. They also make certain assumptions on which their data and 
conclusions flow from that which hasn't been substantiated and won't be until seabed exploita-
tion becomes operational. The basic underlying assumption is that seabed production would be 
competitive with land-based production. Aside from the assumption of profitability other 
variables are significant, such as 1) the state of known land-based reserves; 2) the circumstances 
of seabed production; i. e., marketing, taxation rates, etc.; 3) the changes in the degree of elastic-
ity; and 4) the technological qualities of the seabed minerals. Perfectly reliable quantification of 
the possible impact is admittedly not possible at present. It is important, nevertheless, to examine 
the general conclusions of these studies on those points where relative agreement is present 
because these studies are being used as the basis of evidence in the formulation of a policy for the 
regulation of seabed production and prices. This regulation is necessitated, according to the 
studies, if adverse consequences to the LOC producers economies are to be avoided. This 
evidence has been used to support opposing positions of the nature and extent of these economic 
implications and what solutions are appropriate to offset them, i.e., compensatory financing, 
commodity cartels, quota limitations, etc. 
11. ICNT, supra note I, arts. ISO, 151. 
416 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2, No.2 
are parties to the Convention shall: 1) administer the area; 2) manage its 
resources; and 3) control the activities in the area. It is based upon the 
sovereign equality of all members. Activities would be conducted both directly 
by the Authority and under Authority auspices through: 1) States parties to 
the Convention; 2) State enterprises and; 3) Persons (natural or juridical) 
possessing the nationality of States or controlled by them by entering into serv-
ice contracts, joint ventures, or any form of association which guarantees 
direct and effective control by the Authority itself through the Enterprise. 12 
A look at the actual structural composition of the Authority reveals five 
main organs: the Assembly, the Council, the Secretariat, the Enterprise and 
the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber. 13 
A. The Assembry 
The Assembly14 consists of all members of the Authority, i. e., all States par-
ties to the Convention. It would meet every two years in regular session with 
special session determined at the request of the Secretary-General of the 
Authority, the Councilor the Assembly itself. 
The Assembly would be the supreme policymaking organ, the locus of 
power and authority. It would have the power to lay down guidelines and issue 
directives of a general nature to be pursued by the Councilor other organs. 
Specifically, its powers and duties would include: 15 
1) election of the members of the Council m accordance with 
article 159;16 
2) appointment, upon the recommendation of the Council, of the 
members of the Tribunal and of the Board of Governors; 
3) establishment of such subsidiary organs as may be necessary for 
the performance of its functions; 
4) determination of the contributions of States parties for the ad-
ministrative budget of the Authority; 
5) adoption of financial regulations of the Authority; 
6) approval of the budget of the Authority; 
7) request and consideration of special reports from the Council 
and other organs on any matter within the scope of the Conven-
tion; 
12. Id., art. 150. 
13. See ANNEX of this Comment. 
14. ICNT, supra note 1, arts. 156-158. 
15. /d., art. 158. 
16. Article 159 specifies that 36 members be elected by the Assembly. Of these 18 would be in 
accordance with the principle of equitable geographic representation and 18 with a view toward 
the representation of special interests, i.e., four members from among countries who have 
demonstrated substantial investment and technology resources in the Area, four of the major im-
porters of minerals to be derived from the Area, four of the major exporters of minerals to be 
derived from the Area and six members from the most disadvantaged less developed countries. 
ICNT, supra note 1, art. 159. 
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8) studies and recommendations for the purpose of promoting in-
ternational cooperation and the progressive development and 
codification of international law; 
9) "Establishment and adoption of criteria, rules, regulations and 
procedures for the equitable sharing of benefits derived from the 
area and its resources, taking into special account for the in-
terests and needs of the developing countries, whether coastal or 
landlocked" ; 17 and 
10) "Consideration of problems arising from States in connection 
with the activities in the area, from the landlocked or otherwise 
geographically disadvantaged location of some of them and 
recommending basic guidelines for appropriate action. "18 
417 
In addition, there is a residual powers clause that states that any power or 
function not specifically delegated to other organs of the Authority shall be 
vested in the Assembly,19 
Voting in the Assembly would be on the basis of one vote per State party. 20 
Substantive decisions and the decision of whether a matter is substantive 
would require a two-thirds majority of members present and voting provided 
that a majority of Assembly members are present. 21 Decisions on other mat-
ters would be by a simple majority of members present and voting. 22 Upon 
written request of not less than one third of the members of the Assembly, a 
vote on any matter shall be deferred pending reference to the Sea-Bed 
Disputes Chamber for an advisory opinion on any legal question connected 
therewith. 23 
B. The Council 
The Council would serve as the executive organ of the Authority in acting 
in accordance with the guidelines set by the Assembly,24 Once that policy had 
been established, its application and implementation would become the 
responsibility of the Council. The Assembly would dictate what was to be 
done, the Council in conjunction with its technical supporting staff would 
determine how it was to be done subject, of course, to the approval of the 
Assembly. The Council's functions and duties would be to: 
17. /d., art. 158 (2) (XII). 
18. /d., art. 158 (2) (XIII). 
19. /d., art. 158 (1). 
20. /d., art. 157 (5). 
21. /d., art. 157 (6). 
22. /d., art. 157 (7). 
23. Id., art. 157 (10). 
24. [d., arts. 159-161. 
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1) supervise and coordinate the implementation of the provisions 
of this convention and invite the attention of the Assembly of 
candidates for appointment to the Tribunal and Governing 
Board of the Enterprise; 
2) establish subsidiary organs; 
3) transmit to the Assembly: 
a) schedules of the apportionment of benefits derived from 
activities in the area; 
b) reports of the Enterprise; 
c) annual reports and any special reports that may be requested 
by the Assembly; 
4) approve and supervise the activities of the Enterprise; 
5) approve, on behalf of the Authority, of contracts for activities in 
the area; 
6) adopt, on behalf of the Economic Planning Commission, of any 
programs or measures designed to avoid or minimize the eco-
nomic implications of the exploitation of resources from the 
area; 
7) adopt, upon the recommendation of the Technical Commission, 
of rules, regulations and procedures relating to technical, opera-
tional and financial matters; 
8) make recommendations to States parties relating to measures 
necessary to give effect to the provisions of the convention; and 
9) make recommendations to the Assembly concerning suspension 
of the rights and privileges of membership for gross and persis-
tent violations of the convention.2s 
The members of the Council are to be selected for four year terms at the 
regular sessions of the Assembly in accordance with the aforementioned re-
quirements. 26 In the first election, in order to secure rotating membership, 18 
of the members would be elected to only two year terms.27 Reelection is al-
lowed but not encouraged since rotation of members is desired to achieve 
universal participation. 28 
The Council would meet as often as the operation of its tasks required, but 
not less than three times yearly. It is obliged to establish an Economic Plan-
ning Commission, a Technical Commission and a Rules and Regulations 
Commission. 29 The Economic Planning Commission would be composed of 
18 members appointed by the CounciPo The latter two commissions would be 
composed of 15 members appointed by the Councipl Appointment would be 
25. [d., art. 160. 
26. [d., art. 159(3). 
27. [d. 
28. [d., art. 159 (4). 
29. [d., art. 161. 
30. [d., art. 162. 
31. [d., arts. 163, 164. 
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based upon technical competence with due regard for special interests and the 
desirability of equitable geographic representation. They would not serve as 
representatives of their nations but rather in the capacity of international civil 
servants, as does the staff of the United Nations. The SNT called for the ap-
pointment of' 'persons of high moral character who may be relied upon to ex-
ercise independent judgment. They serve in their individual capacity. "32 
States parties to the Convention would submit names of nominees for ap-
pointment who would serve three year terms if appointed. 33 They would 
receive remuneration from the Authority and be eligible for appointment to 
an additional term of office. 34 A chairman and two vice-chairmen would be 
selected yearly by each commission. Voting would be on the two-thirds 
majority principle35 in contrast to the three-fourths majority of the members 
present and voting in the Council. 36 These commissions would meet as often 
as required. 
The main duties of the Economic Planning Commission include: 
1) to prepare the extent of the area and the volume of the area to be 
made available for exploitation; 
2) to take action, including commodity arrangements and buffer 
stock arrangements, to minimize the adverse economic implica-
tions for LDCs whose export earnings are affected; and 
3) to receive from States parties, whose economies are affected, re-
quests for investigations into any problems or solutions over-
looked by the Commission. 37 
The Technical Commission is charged with the supervision of activities in 
the area, preparation of studies and reports, and the formulation and submis-
sion to the Council of technical and operational rules, regulations and pro-
cedures relating to: 
1) the management of seabed resources; 
2) ocean and marine engineering and mining and mining process-
ing technology; 
3) operation of marine installations, equipment and devices, ocean 
and environmental research; 
4) actuarial and accounting techniques; 
5) preparation of reports regarding the Area; and 
6) inspection of all activities in the Area. 38 
32. SNT, supra note 2, art. 29 (5). 
33. leNT, supra note I, art. 161 (2). 
34. Id., art. 161 (5). 
35. [d., art. 161 (8). 
36. Id., art. 159 (7). 
37. Id., art. 162. 
38. [d., art. 163. 
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The Rules and Regulation Commission would be responsible for the for-
mulation and submission to the Council the rules, regulations and procedures 
of article 160(2)(XIV) as well as the preparation of studies and reports at the 
request of the Council. 39 
C . The Secretariat 
The Secretariat of the Authority40 is composed of a Secretary-General and 
supporting staff. The Secretary-General, who would be appointed by the 
Assembly upon the recommendation of the Council, will function as the chief 
administrative officer of the Authority, being required to submit an annual 
report to the Assembly. However, much of the power relating to inspection 
vested in the Secretariat under the SNT has been transferred to the Technical 
Commission under the ICNT. 
The Secretary-General had been empowered under the SNT to establish a 
staff of inspectors to determine and oversee compliance with the provisions of 
the Convention. This staff would report situations of non-compliance or viola-
tion to the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General in turn would then in-
form the Chairman of the Council and the Chairman of the Technical Com-
mission of such situations. These inspectors would have had unlimited access 
to all places, data, and people dealing with activities in the area.4' Most of 
these responsibilities were transferred to the Technical Commission by the 
ICNTY Stripped of these powers, the Secretariat is mainly an administrative 
body whose "staff shall be kept to a minimum. "43 
D. The Enterprise 
The Enterprise is the organ of the Authority which is charged with the 
preparation and execution of mining activities in the area by the Authority. H 
It is the operational organ of the Authority through which exploitation of the 
area assigned to the Authority under the terms of the Convention either in 
monopolistic fashion or, as seems likely to emerge as a compromise, the "two 
areas system" procedure. It would do this either on its own or through service 
or partnership arrangements with existing firms. 45 This type of subcontracting 
is analogous to the procedure used by public utility companies today in the 
United States in subcontracting work out to private firms when their own 
man-power or equipment is insufficient. 
39. Id., art. 164. 
40. Id., arts. 165-168. 
41. SNT, supra note 2, arts. 40-41. 
42. Compare id. with ICNT, supra note 1, art. 163. 
43. ICNT, supra note 1, art. 166 (1). 
44. !d., art. 169. 
45. See id., Annex III, art. 151. 
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It would act in this capacity as would a contractor, actually doing the min-
ing operation itself or awarding service contracts to third parties on behalf of 
the Authority. Though subject to the general policy considerations outlined by 
the Assembly and the supervision of the Council, the Enterprise "shall within 
the framework of the international legal personality of the Authority, have 
such legal capacity and functions as provided for in the Statute set forth in an-
nex III to the present Convention.' '46 Exploration and exploitation would be 
conducted under the so called' 'parallel system. " Private and state enterprises 
would be virtually free to conduct deep seabed prospecting. Once sites have 
been identified for exploration and potential exploitation, the private or state 
enterprise would submit an application under the sponsorship of its state for a 
contract to explore and exploit an area of the seabed "sufficiently large and of 
sufficient value to allow the Authority to determine that one half of it shall be 
reserved solely for the conduct of activities by the Authority through the 
Enterprise or in association with developing countries.' '47 
The Authority would then select one site for the applicant to work and 
would designate the other as a reserved area to be exploited by the Enterprise 
or by developing countries directly. 48 A contract would be entered into be-
tween the applicant and the Authority if the applicant met all the requirements 
of the Convention and those specified in the rules and regulations of the 
Authority. In addition to normal qualifications, conditions on transfer of 
technology, payments to the Authority, and procedures to protect the marine 
environment would have to be met. 49 
An alternative to direct contracting for State and private commercial en-
tities would be to enter into an arrangement with the exploitation arm of the 
Authority, the Enterprise, to do all or part of the mining activities that the 
Enterprise would wish to conduct. The Enterprise would appear to be 
analogous to a corporation established pursuant to the Convention, with the 
parties to the Convention serving as the shareholders. 50 This parallel system 
with State-sponsored commercial entities on one side and the Enterprise on 
the other, would be in force for the first twenty years of the Convention, and 
would be subject to renegotiation at a review conference to be held at the con-
clusion of that periodY 
46. /d., art. 169 (2). 
47. /d., Annex II, art. 5 U)(i). 
48. Id., Annex II, art. 5 U)(ii). 
49. See id., arts. 151, 160, Annex II, arts. 3-5, 10. 
50. See id., arts. 151, 160, Annex II, art. 6; Annex III. 
51. Id., art. 153. 
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III. ELEMENTS OF CONFLICT IMPEDING AGREEMENT 
A. Historical Background: The SNT 
While there were key areas of conflict between the States negotiating the 
SNT, some progress had been achieved. An attitude of limited compromise 
was present at the Fifth Session. This was exemplified by two manifestations 
of this spirit. The first was the apparent agreement on the' 'two areas" system 
of exploitation. 52 This proposal was addressed to the question of who shall ex-
ploit the area. The second was the April 10, 1976 decision53 of the United 
States to agree to the temporary limitation of seabed exploitation in order to 
minimize the adverse economic implications54 for the economies of the LDCs 
52. &e note 7 supra. 
53. This was announced in a speech by then Secretary of State Kissinger before members of 
the Foreign Policy Association, the U.S. Council of the International Chamber of Commerce, 
and the United Nations Association on April 9, 1976. Kissinger Prods Sea-Law Session, N.Y. Times, 
April 9, 1976, at 1, col. 4; see also the discussion in Teltsch, u.s. &abed Proposals Set Off Debate, 
N.Y. Times, April 11, 1976, at 10, col. 1. 
54. At first glance, the fears of the LDCs with regard to the impact of deep seabed mining 
seem well-founded, i.e., price deterioration of these minerals can be expected from the increase in 
supply. Upon closer analysis, however, several factors stand out. Firstly, the markets and prices 
for manganese and copper are not expected, on the basis of United Nations' studies, to be 
seriously affected. Most of the impact will be upon the nickel and cobalt markets. 
Closer examination of the cobalt and nickel markets and the pattern of trade and production is 
revealing. The number ofLDCs that export large quantities of these minerals are few. The role of 
developing countries in the production of nickel is small and only three of them are involved to 
any appreciable extent. They are Cuba, Indonesia, and New Caledonia. In 1968 New Caledonia 
accounted for three-fourths of the total LDC total with nickel accounting for about 2% of Cuba's 
total exports and less than 6% of Indonesia's total exports. The respective figures are even 
smaller for percentages of GNP and foreign exchange earnings. 26 U.N. GAOR, Comm. on the 
Peaceful Uses of the Seabed 36, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/36, table 13 (1971). 
The case is similar with cobalt. Only three LDCs export significant amounts of cobalt, i.e., 
Zaire, Morocco and Zambia. These amounts are small in terms of percentages of GNP and total 
export earnings. Cobalt represented only 5% of Zaire's total exports and .6% of Zambia's total 
exports. Id., table 14. In terms of GNP, cobalt accounted for .2% and .3% respectively. Only 
Zaire generated more than 1 % of its foreign exchange from cobalt exports. 3 U.N. CLOSOR 
164, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/C.l/L.5 (1974) [hereinafter cited as A/Conf. 62/C.l/L.5.] 
Even in these few instances the general consequence of seabed production will be the displace-
ment of marginal land production. It is unlikely that the operations of relatively greater efficiency 
will be affected. The net result of price and volume changes might be that total earnings decline 
or increase less rapidly. This impact is still largely undetermined despite extensive attention 
directed at its determination. There are too many intervening variables such as relative efficien-
cies, patterns of trade, and market structures. 
It can be ascertained from them that the disruption to the LDC economies that would be af-
fected at all would be somewhat less than catastrophic. But any loss of export income creates ad-
ditional problems for economies already strained by the process of development. Going beyond 
the percentages of GNP and foreign exchange earnings that would be affected several other ef-
fects might be mentioned. Subsidiary aspects of disruption such as the promotion of other in-
dustries within the economy, creation of employment and unemployment, etc., i.e., the spinoffs 
of a slight decline in GNP, may be more substantial than the actual percentage decline of the 
GNP. While export quotas and buffer stocks, two traditional schemes to deal with the problems 
of primary products are not applicable there are other approaches that have been suggested. 
These include compensatory financing, preventive price-fixing and production controls. Com-
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who export the minerals in question. Manganese55 and, more importantly, 
pensatory financing would include taxing the revenues of deep seabed mining operations with 
these revenues being collected and redistributed by international machinery to those LDC ex-
porters affected by the deep seabed exploitation. This would most effectively and selectively assist 
those particular countries directly affected. The preventive mechanisms of artificially limiting 
production or setting artificially high prices would have an affect on the "fourth world" LDCs in 
much the same way that the OPEC price rise did. These States, who are particularly natural 
resource deficient, would be forced to pay higher prices. For some recent examples of the con-
stant fluctuation of world mineral prices, see Copper Prices Leap, Reaching Records at Some Companies, 
Wall St. J., Feb. 6, 1979, at 38, col. 2; Price of Zinc Settles At 37.5 Cents a Pound, Wall St. J., Feb. 9, 
1979, at 31, col. 3; Lead, Zinc Surge Seen as Part of Metals Craze Rqlecting Inflation, Political Unrest 
Worries, Wall St. J., Feb. 22,1979, at 37, col. 3. For a discussion of the source of supply prob-
lem, see European Countries Stockpile Minerals in Case Unstable Nations Cut Deliveries, Wall St. J., Feb. 
26, 1979, at 24, col. 1. 
Preventative mechanisms are less selective in their effects. Under a compensatory financing 
system there would be a redistribution of wealth from the taxes paid by the mining companies to 
the LDC exporters without directly further deteriorating the position of the "fourth world" 
LDCs. There is no easy solution to the problem. This was aptly summed up in a working paper 
submitted by the United States to the Law of the Sea Conference in 1974 which stated: 
To the extent that there are beneficiaries of restricting seabed production, they will be 
land-based producers who are largely the industrially developed countries. Those suf-
fering the greatest losses will be the world's consumers, including the peoples of the 
lesser developed economies who depend so heavily upon the capital goods made with 
these minerals for increasing their future standards of living. 
A/Conf. 62/C.l/L.5, supra, at 10. The proper use of policy instruments is essential if a sufficiently 
broad strategy for the exploitation of the nodules is to be achieved. 
Factors affecting supply and demand and prices of minerals obtainable from the deep seabed 
must be considered in outlining the basic framework for a successful and equitable approach to 
the problem. This approach must be politically satisfactory and implementable from the perspec-
tives of both the LDCs and the developed countries. It would have to include: a) schedules of the 
total seabed area for total volume which would become available for exploitation; b) conditions 
for limitations on the recovery of some resources; c) mechanism for the stabilization of minerals 
at just prices; and d) schedules of compensatory payments that might be made to LDC's affected 
by deep seabed mining. See 4 U.N. CLOSOR 121, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/37 (1975). Whatever 
the approach taken to the solution of the problem, prices will invariably be higher than they 
might otherwise be. This is perhaps the real problem. Reference can be made to the near 
disastrous impact of the OPEC-induced oil price rise in the "fourth world" LDCs. For a discus-
sion of the situation in Angola see Adelman, Reportfrom Angola, 53 FOREIGN AFF. 566 (1975); Mar-
cum, Lessons of Angola, 54 FOREIGN AFF. 407 (1976). The problem with seeking the best and most 
appropriate economic solution is that it may not prove to be politically feasible. 
55. The relative importance of these minerals, the LDCs that produce them and the impor-
tance of that production to their economies can be ascertained in terms of the relative percentage 
of the total GNP and the amount of foreign exchange generated by such production. Manganese 
is used primarily in the production of steel in the form of alloys with silicon and iron. In fact 94% 
of world manganese consumption is in the steel industry with another 5 % consumed for chemical 
and allied uses and the remaining 1 % for dry cell batteries. There are virtually no feasible 
substitutes at present. 1971 Report, supra note 10, at 24. While there has been a fairly steady rise 
in manganese consumption (an average of 5% yearly from 1950 to 1968), production has paced 
this increase and more so resulting in a decrease in priceS. 14 UNCTAD (Provisional Agenda 
Item 4), U.N. Doc. TC/B/483 (1974); id., Add. I [hereinafter cited as 14 UNCTAD]. Future de-
mand is not expected to be substantially greater than the 5% average annual increase that has 
been witnessed in the past two decades. 1971 Report, supra, note 10, at 26. Existing supplies are 
certainly ample. Reserve deposits of manganese ore are the equivalent of some one billion tons. 
They are double the cumulative demand projected for the world through the year 2000. /d. Any 
discussion of reserves suffers from certain deficiencies. One is the diversity and range of various 
estimates such as those by Professor John Tien of Columbia University, the Club of Rome, and 
the World Bank. Other factors such as recycling and one pointed out by Radetzki who states: 
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copper56 are the most important minerals, of lesser importance are nickel57 
"Economic analysis also suggests that exhaustion will be delayed by a general increase in prices 
and a consequent fall in demand, as even poorer ores are exploited." Radetzki, Metal Mineral 
Resource Exhaustion and the Threat to Material Progress: The Case of Copper, 3 WORLD DEV. 123 (1975); 
accord Rosenberg, Innovative Responses to Materials Shortages, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 111 (1973). The 
largest single producer of manganese is the U.S.S.R. which in 1968 accounted for 33% of the 
world total. Other major producers include; South Africa, Brazil, India, Gabon and Australia. 
The LDCs, while accounting for only 36% of world production, nonetheless represent 60% of 
world trade in manganese. 1971 Report, supra note 10, Annex, tables A.5, A.9. Major importers 
have been the European Community, the U.S., Japan and the United Kingdom. 
While seabed exploitation as a source of manganese might be expected to contribute to already 
seriously deteriorating prices, the removal of manganese from the nodules had not been proven 
either technologically or commercially attractive. Report of the Secretary-General, 27 U.N. 
GAOR, Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed 14, U.N. Doc. AlAC. 138173 (1972) 
[hereinafter cited as 1972 Report); Report of the Secretary-General, 3 U.N. CLOSOR 4, U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF. 62125 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974 Report). The demand schedule for 
manganese is fairly inelastic with no new uses foreseen to absorb increased supplies even at lower 
prices. It is expected that until and unless the technological capacity is developed for the commer-
cially feasible extraction of manganese from the nodules, seabed exploitation will have relatively 
little impact upon the manganese market. If manganese is extracted from the nodules, the 
estimates vary but the conclusion is obvious. 14 UNCTAD, supra. 
56. Copper is consumed in the form of ores and concentrates, refined copper and copper prod-
ucts. Approximately one half of the demand for copper is for use in electrical equipment and sup-
plies. Major secondary sources of demand arise from the communications industry, i.e., elec-
tronics, telephone and telegraph, wire and cable, radio, television, etc. The construction industry 
is responsible for some 16 % of demand with another 12 % going into the transportation industry 
and approximately 10% is earmarked for the production of copper alloys. 14 UNCTAD, supra 
note 55. Virtually irreplaceable for some uses, it faces damaging competition from aluminum, 
plastics, steel and glass, especially in the electrical, construction and communications industries. 
This trend of substitutibility has been reinforced by rapidly fluctuating prices and supplies 
although stable supplies and lower prices result in a return to copper usage in many instances. 
Despite the recent slack in the demand for copper, the long term prospect appears somewhat 
more favorable with average growth rates forecasted at between 3.7 and 5.2 percent yearly to the 
year 2000. 1971 Report, supra note 10, at 27. Reserves appear to be substantial and it is an-
ticipated that areas such as Iran and Indonesia having porphyry deposits will acquire some im-
portance. U.S. Bureau of Mines, Mineral Facts and Problems (1974). Significant for these 
reserve figures and any others is the ease and the frequency of recycling copper. 
The major producers of copper include the U.S., U.S.S.R., Zambia, Chile, Canada, Zaire, 
and Peru, while the primary consumers include Europe, the P.R.C. and the United States. As is 
the case with manganese, albeit for slightly differing reasons, production of copper from the 
nodules is expected to have relatively little impact on the world copper market. As with 
manganese, copper is difficult and expensive to extract from the nodules. The relative amounts of 
copper in the nodules is too small to have a sizeable impact upon the enormous world demand 
figures. See note 10 supra. The demand for copper is approximately ten times the demand for 
nickel, but metal production from the nodules will be approximately in the ratio of four tons of 
copper per five tons of nickel. On the basis of this relationship the effect of seabed mining on cop-
per markets (if copper is extracted from the nodules at all) under present trends would be one-
tenth the impact on nickel markets. 1972 Report, supra note 55, at 14; 1971 Report, supra note 10, 
at 8-9; A/Conf. 62/C.l/L.5, supra note 54, at 4. Admittedly, this relationship could be altered if 
the demand for nickel increased faster than the demand for copper. For example, assuming that 
nickel demand were to increase by 40% and copper demand only by 10%, then in thirty years 
copper demand would only be two times nickel demand as opposed to ten times. It is anticipated 
that it will take this long for the state of technology to be able to extract copper from the nodules 
at a commercially feasible cost. This is but one of the variables that the assumptions and forecasts 
of these studies are subject to. 
57. The primary finished product users of nickel are the chemical, petroleum and aircraft in-
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and cobalt. 58 In return for this concession, the United States presumably had 
ended successfully its quest for free transit through international straits and 
navigational rights within the 200 mile economic zone. Here can be observed 
an example of the operation of the package deal concept of trade-offs in the dif-
ferent parts of the SNT. 
These examples are not exhaustive but are mentioned to point out that an 
dustries. Nickel is an extremely important alloy in stainless steel and its uses in stainless steel and 
other nickel alloys make up one half of the total demand for nickel. These other nickel alloys in-
clude plating, construction steel, iron and steel castings and copper and brass products. Its im-
portance in desalinization technology represents a possible future source of potentially high de-
mand. Substitutibility is not widespread at present since alternate metals involve increased costs 
and sacrifice of quality. Nickel imparts properties to alloys such as increased strength and 
resistance to corrosion that cannot be duplicated through the use of substitutes at present. The 
demand for nickel has been increasing substantially, especially in the stainless steel industry 
where growth prospects have been perhaps never looked better. Demand is expected to be 
stronger than present supply schedules with long term growth rates in demand estimated at six to 
seven percent yearly. U.S. demand alone is expected to triple by the year 2000. 1971 Report, 
supra note 10, at 29. Nickel is present in two types of ore. Sulphide ores which, presently account 
for 8% of world production, are mined underground. Lateritic ores, which presently make up 
20% of world production, are mined in open pit operations. Lateritic oxide processing, known as 
beneficiation, is more difficult and costly than the process for sulphide ores. Known reserves are 
almost the exact opposite of present consumption, i.e., 20% sulphide ore and 80% lateritic oxide 
ore. U.S. Bureau of Mines, Mineral Facts and Problems (1974). Scrap nickel is a significant 
source of supply with 15% of the U.S. supply coming from recycled nickel. 1971 Report, supra 
note 10, at 9, 29. Production is fairly concentrated. Three nations (Canada, New Caledonia, and 
the U.S.S.R.) accounted for 87% of world production in 1968. The other six producers are 
Cuba, U.S., Indonesia, South Africa, Australia, and Finland. Recent years have witnessed sup-
ply shortages and six producers are Cuba, U.S., Indonesia, South Africa, Australia, and 
Finland. Recent years have witnessed supply shortages and considerable price increases. The 
United States, Europe and Japan are the main importers. 
These recurrent shortages and ensuing high prices have seen foreign investment encouraging 
the development and exploitation of nickel reserves. The anticipated rise in demand will intensify 
this trend. An important variable here is the possible substitutibility of cobalt for nickel. See note 
58 infra. In any event, nickel is expected to be the mainstay of the nodule industry accounting for 
50% of its gross revenues. 1972 Report, supra note 55, at 30. The increase in demand would be 
greater if prices declined because of its value as a substitute. For these reasons and others that will 
be mentioned later, it doesn't appear that seabed mining will have as great of an adverse effect 
upon LDC nickel exporters as might appear. 
58. Cobalt is a relatively expensive (to the extent that its price quotations are in pounds in-
stead of tons) but important alloying metal employed in a considerable number of industrial 
products, both metallic and non-metallic. It is particularly important for use in electronic devices 
and certain paints and ceramics, as an element in carbides and high-strength magnets, and on 
super alloys employed in the production of aircraft turbines. As might be expected, the 
characteristics of the metal are its resistance to high temperatures and its magnetic and chemical 
properties. It is particularly suited for the sophisticated advanced technology industries with few 
substitutes available. 13 UNCTAD (Provisional Agenda Item 4), U.N. Doc. TD/B/449/Add. 1 
(1973) [hereinafter cited as 13 UNCTAD). 
At a considerably lower price cobalt could be substituted for other metals, in particular nickel. 
When cobalt becomes less expensive than nickel, as it did in 1968, it can be used where nickel is 
used especially in alloys and plating. At present prices, cobalt is used only when it can reduce 
fabricating costs. Id. 
A crucial variable in the consideration of cobalt is the fact that it is produced from land-based 
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attitude of conciliation and compromise was present. Whether this attitude 
will prevail through the negotiation of other contentious issues remains to be 
seen. The notion of a package deal, i. e., all four parts of the SNT59 being ac-
cepted or none of them, predominated because it was felt that the greatest op-
portunity for compromise was present with the possibility of trade-offs among 
the four parts and the wide range of issues dealt with therein. 60 The points of 
conflict that will be elaborated upon in this section are not all-inclusive; rather, 
they are offered as representative of the basic points of divergence between the 
United States, the Group of 77, and to a lesser extent the Soviet Union at this 
stage of the negotiations. 
In the negotiations up to and including the SNT, there had been several 
areas of conflict between the basic positions taken by the United States and the 
Group of 77. 61 The position of the Soviet Union had been somewhat am-
biguous but, seemed to lean toward the position of the United States on the 
sources as a by-product of other primary ores such as lateritic oxide nickel and copper. The U. S. 
Bureau of Mines has estimated that U.S. demand for cobalt will be between 18 and 30 million 
pounds in the year 2000. U.S. Bureau of Mines, Mineral Facts and Problems (1974). These 
figures represent a growth rate of between 1 and 2.5 percent based on present prices. The rest of 
the world's consumption is expected to be between 41 and 54 million pounds in the year 2000 up 
from present consumption of slightly less than 30 million pounds. The Cobalt Information 
Center, an organization that monitors cobalt research and outlook in Europe and the Western 
Hemisphere, estimated that the 10-year period of 1958 to 1968 witnessed an average yearly in-
crease in consumption of from 7 to 8 percent. Land-based production is expected to be adequate 
to meet existing demand especially with increased supplies from lateritic oxide nickel deposits. 
1971 Report, supra note 10, 32. It is helpful to note that scrap cobalt is generated in fairly large 
quantities but, little information is available on actual amounts. In 1968 world production was 
approximately 20,000 tons with Zaire producing over one-half of this total. Zambia, Canada, 
Morocco and Finland supplied the rest. 13 UNCTAD, supra, at 3. 
The anticipated high volume of cobalt production from the nodules relative to present demand 
schedules suggests that this market may be the first to be effected from seabed production. One 
early report estimated that a single mining operation could supply 8% of demand in 1980 ex-
trapolating from current demand schedules. 1972 Report, supra note 55, at 11. This figure is 
lessened somewhat by two factors: 1) demand for cobalt would increase substantially if prices 
decreased; and 2) the nature of the present market structure allows the dominant producers to 
restrict supply in response to price movements. Cobalt production from the seabed will reduce 
prices but there is a floor to the decrease in cobalt prices, i.e., the price of nickel. Since cobalt can 
substitute for nickel if the price of cobalt drops to the price of nickel then the increased demand 
will tend to prevent further price decreases and perhaps increase them although certainly not 
back to their original level. 
59. Part IV of the SNT is a separate section entitled "Settlement of Disputes." 5 U.N. 
CLOSOR 185, U.N. Doc. AlConf. 62/WP. 9/Pt.4sd (1976). This issue is fully dealt with in 
Adede, Settlement oj Disputes Arising Under the Law oj the Sea Convention, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 798 
(1975). 
60. This type of tradeoff is suggested by Gardner, supra note 8. 
61. An abbreviated listing of documents and statements by the contending groups of States 
with regard to Part I of the SNT follows. They remain substantially unchanged in the ICNT. See 
The Soviet Position, 4 U.N. CLOSOR 182, U.N. Doc. AlConf. 62/C.lIL.12 (1975) [hereinafter 
cited as Soviet position]; Group of 77 Position, The Kampala Declaration; 3 U.N. CLOSOR 3, 
U.N. Doc. AlConf. 62/23 (1974); The Declaration of the Organization of African Unity, 3 U.N. 
CLOSOR 63, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/33 (1974); Chile, 3 U.N. CLOSOR 177, U.N. Doc. 
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Issues relating to the status of the International Authority in Part I of the 
SNT.62 The United States steadfastly maintained that there ought to be a 
weighted system of voting and/or a veto power in the Council. Furthermore, 
the United States had contended that the locus of power and authority be 
vested in the Council rather than the Assembly. In addition, the United States 
sought to keep the degree of power given to the Authority at a minimum 
level. 63 These general positions have been taken by most of the industrialized 
countries and the Soviet Union. 64 The position of the Group of 77 is largely 
represented in the form Part I of the SNT, i.e., equal voting, the Assembly as 
the supreme organ, and significant power vested in the Authority. The Group 
of 77 also sought to increase the attention given to the objective of minimizing 
the economic implications for those LDCs who are mineral exporters65 and are 
likely to be affected by the exploitation of the seabed. The United States has 
acceded to production controls.66 In these three areas the basic positions are 
represented. The Group of 77 is seeking a strong International Authority 
dedicated to their needs with equal voting principles enabling the members of 
the Group to dominate the operation of the Assembly. The industrialized 
countries have thus far been resisting such a scenario, having observed at close 
range in the 30th General Assembly of the United Nations what an extension 
of democratic principles can mean for an embattled minority. 
This already chaotic situation of deadlock was exacerbated by increased 
pressure upon the Government from domestic quarters in the United States to 
commence unilaterally deep seabed exploitation in the absence of an interna-
tional agreement and despite the so called moratorium. 67 Such threats of 
A/Conf. 62/C.lIL.ll (1974); Czechoslovakia, 3 U.N. CLOSOR 189, U.N. Doc. A/Con£. 
62/C.2/L.ll , (1974); Japan, 3 U.N. CLOSOR 175, U.N. Doc. A/Con£. 621C.lIL.9, (1974); 
Belgium, Denmark, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxemborg, Netherlands, 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 3 U.N. CLOSOR 173, U.N. Doc. 
A/Conf.62/C.lIL8 (1974); United States, 3 U.N. CLOSOR 164, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 
62/C.1IL.5 (1974); and 3 U.N. CLOSOR 169, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62 C.lIL.6 (1974). 
62. The convergence of the U.S. position and that of the U.S.S.R. has been particularly 
noticeable on the isues of voting procedure in the Council and a weak International Authority 
that leaves the industrialized States with control over the resources of the deep seabed. See Soviet 
position supra note 61. 
63. Darman, The Law of the Sea: Rethinking u.s. Interests, 56 FOREIGN AFF. 373 (1977) 
[hereinafter cited as Darman]. 
64. Soviet position, supra note 61. 
65. See notes 54-58 supra. 
66. This is incorporated in ICNT, supra note 1, art. 150(B)(i). 
67. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1134 Bifore the Subcomm. on Minerals, Materials and Fuels of the Senate 
Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); Hearings on S. 2801 Bifore the Senate 
Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); Hearings on H.R. 7732 Bifore the 
Subcomm. on Oceanography and the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1973); Hearings Bifore the Subcomm. on the Outer Continental Shelf of the Senate Comm. on Interior and In-
sular Affairs, 91 st Cong., 1 st & 2d Sess., (1970); for a complete legislative history beginning with 
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unilateral action by the U.S. met with hostility from numerous LDC delega-
tions to the Conference. The most notable reaction was in response to the at-
tempt by a subsidiary of a U.S. firm, Deep Sea Ventures, Inc., to receive 
diplomatic protection from the United States State Department for a claim on 
the deep seabed in the eastern part of the north Pacific Ocean. 68 The State 
Department refused to extend such protection. 69 Nonetheless, negative and 
hostile reactions were expressed by many LDCs as well as some industrialized 
States. 70 
B. The leNT and Issues Going Into the Eighth Session 
There are many areas of conflict now present. Many of these basic points in 
question such as: 1) the issue of what entities are to be responsible for the ex-
ploitation of the Area during the interim period; 2) the question of the manner 
in which the activities are to be carried out; 3) the predominant role to be per-
formed by the Authority in the organization, conduct and control of the ac-
tivities; and 4) the question of certain specific obligations of the contracting 
parties (such as the obligation to transmit technology to the Enterprise), have 
received tentative agreement. 71 Some functions of the Authority have caused 
difficulty, especially those connected with the equitable sharing of profits, the 
conduct of marine scientific research and the transfer of technology. 72 
Three major issues relating to the deep seabed require resolution before any 
real progress can be said to have been achieved: 
1) the system of exploitation; 
2) the political control of the Authority and the related issues of the 
Council's jurisdiction, composition, and voting system; and 
3) the Authority's resource policy. 
hearings before a special subcommittee in 1969, see S. REP. No. 1125, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 56-58 
(1978) [hereinafter cited as S. REP.j; see also Auburn, The International Seabed Area, 20 INT'L & 
COMPo L. Q. 173 (1971). For a concise analysis of the earlier legislation, see A. M. Browne, Law 
of the Sea Conference: Issue Brief Number IB74104, at 1·18 (Feb. 24,1976) (Library of Congress 
Congressional Research Service report). 
68. This was filed with the office of the Secretary of State on November 15, 1974. See 14 INT'L 
LEGAL MAT'LS 51 (1975). 
69. /d. 
70. For the Canadian response, see id., at 67-68; for the Australian response, see id., at 795; for 
the British response, see id., at 796. Much of the reaction of the LDCs came in the course of the 
debate in the First Committee at the third Geneva session of the Conference. 
71. Darman, supra note 63, at 390-95. 
72. 10 U.N. CLOSOR 14, U.N. Doc. A/Conf: 62 RCNG 1 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 
RCNGj. They have been removed from Article 151 and have been placed in the articles contain-
ing the general principles concerned. With regard to the transfer of technology, the changes made 
in Article 144 of the ICNT, supra note 1 and particularly those made in certain subparagraphs of 
paragraph 4 in id., annex II result in the establishment of what, in my view, are more realistic. 
and more specific rules than those contained in the Composite Text. 
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Within these main areas are subsidiary issues including the financial 
arrangements for the contractors, the dispute settlement system, the review 
clause and the provisional entry into force of the text. These present a number 
of problems. For example, looking at the problems involved in the financial 
arrangements of the contractors, one can observe the type of issues that arise: 
1) the amount of the application fee; 
2) the amounts of the annual fixed fee, if paid annually or if paid in 
a lump sum; 
3) the percentage of the market value of the processed metals, or the 
percentage of the amount of the processed metals produced from 
the nodules extracted from the contract area, which a Contractor 
should pay to the Authority, if he chooses to make his financial 
contributions by way of the production charge; 
4) in the case of a Contractor who chooses to make his financial con-
tributions by way of a combination of production charge and 
share of net proceeds, three questions remain outstanding: first, 
how much should the Contractor pay by way of production 
charge?; second, what percentage of the Contractor's total net pro-
ceeds should be attributed to mining of the resources of the con-
tract area?; third, what should be the Authority's share of the net 
proceeds attributable to the mining of the resources of the con-
tract area, on each of the eight levels of profitability. 73 
The heart of the political issue is in the Council articles. It is ambiguous to 
what extent the Assembly has the power to dictate Council actions. If the 
Assembly could dictate the Council's actions then political control would lie in 
the Assembly which would be dominated by the Group of 77 as a result of the 
one nation, one vote voting provision. 74 If in fact the Council has independent 
power then the issue becomes the composition and its voting system. 75 
As has been discussed,76 there has been agreement as to the creation of a 
parallel system of exploitation. But agreement ends here. The parallel system 
was designed to assure access of the Enterprise as well as State and private 
companies to the Area. Although the ICNT has adopted a parallel system of 
exploitation, it does so in such a way as to virtually assure that the Enterprise 
will be the only entity to have effective access to the area. Since the Group of 
77 would like to see the Enterprise have exclusive rights of exploitation, the 
ICNT approximates the position and the desires of the Group of 77. Under 
the ICNT the Authority is given significant power and discretion to control 
and deny access to the area by State and private enterprises. No limitations 
73. RCNG, supra note 72, at ii; see Charney, United States Interests in a Convention on the Law of the 
Sea: The Case for Continued Elforts, 11 V AND. J. TRANSNAT"L L. 39 (1978). 
74. ICNT, supra note 1, art. 157 (5). 
75. !d., art. 159 (3). 
76. See note 7 supra. 
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are placed on the activities of the Enterprise. 77 In addition, the ICNT, in ef-
fect, provides that the Enterprise shall have the benefits of unlimited financ-
ing, exclusive access to one-half the sites suggested by the State and private en-
tities and mandated transfer of technology. 78 These conditions effectively deny 
entry into commercial activities by State and private entities. 
The resource policy issue has manifested itself in the conflict between the 
advocates of unlimited seabed production and the producers of land-based 
sources of supply who want the Authority to have the power to limit the 
amount of production from the seabed. 79 This limitation has been achieved in 
the ICNT in the form of a 20 year limitation upon the production of nickel 
from the manganese nodules to 60 percent of the cumulative growth of world 
demand for nickel. 80 The review clause issue came out of a proposal by the 
then Secretary of State Kissinger in an attempt to encourage the Group of 77 
to be flexible in exchange for an agreement to renegotiate the major parts of 
the seabed text at a conference to be convened in 20 years. 81 Much dispute still 
exists as to whether the text should specify what the regime should do if the 
conferees fail to agree. 82 
It is clear that fundamental uncertainties are present as to what the future of 
the Law of the Sea Text will be. Which group or groups of states will be able to 
dominate decision-making within the Authority? The group having power 
within a powerful Assembly or a powerful Council could control who would 
exploit the Area and how it would be exploited. Within these contexts come 
the issues of how much mineral exploitation could be marketed commercially, 
at what price it would be sold, and at whose cost and by whose technology it 
would be exploited. The industrialized nations have developed and are in the 
process of developing at great expense the technology required to exploit the 
deep seabed. 83 
Under the Authority as it is presently established under the ICNT the DCs 
would not be assured of access to mining sites, they would be forced to share 
their costly technology with the Authority, and many other limitations would 
be imposed. For this reason and other reasons beyond the narrow scope of this 
77. ICNT, supra note 1, arts. 150, 151. 
78. Ste id., Annex II (Basic Conditions of Exploration and Exploitation, see especially art. 5). 
79. See notes 54-58 supra. 
80. ICNT, supra note 1, art. 150(B)(i). 
81. /d., art. 153. 
82. [d., art. 153(6) mandates the elimination of the parallel system if the conference is unable 
to reach agreement within 5 years. This is the so-called converging system. 
83. See notes 54-58 supra; Hearings on HR. 3350, HR. 4582, HR. 3652, HR. 4922, HR. 
5624, HR. 6846, and HR. 6784 Bifore the Subcomm. on Oceanography and the Comm. on Merchant 
Marine and Fisheries, 95th Cong., 1 st Sess. 65 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Hearings) and; Joint Hear-
ings on S. 2053 Bifore the Subcomm. on Public Lands and Resources of the Comm. on Energy and Natural 
Resources and the Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 95th Cong., lst Sess. 474-513 (1977) 
[hereinafter cited as Joint Hearings). 
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paper, the United States has refused to agree to such a text that vests signifi-
cant decision-making power in the LDCs within the Authority.84 It is this text 
that has spurred interest in the United States Congress to unilaterally adopt 
legislation that would provide the basic elements required by American con-
sortium groups before they can proceed to begin actual exploitation of the 
deep seabed. 
IV. THE UNITED STATES' UNILATERAL LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE 
A. Background 
Legislation on the subject of deep seabed hard mineral resources has been 
under consideration in the House Committee on Merchant Marine and 
Fisheries since the 92nd Congress. 85 In each session of Congress, final action 
was delayed because of repeated assurances that the upcoming session of the 
U. N. Law of the Sea Conference would culminate with a successful Law of the 
Sea Text. Every time the predictions of success by Administration officials 
proved to be incorrect. The most recent Law of the Sea Conference Session 
was no more successful than the past and, as a result, both the Senate and the 
House proceeded with detailed hearings on a number of bills designed to pro-
tect the interests of the United States and provide a legal framework for con-
sortia involved in the technology for deep seabed exploitation. 86 The general 
characteristics of the legislation include the following: 
84. See U.S. LOS Delegation, Report on the Resumed Seventh Session of the Third United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, New York, Aug. 21-Sept. 15, 1978 (Sept. 23,1978); 
Statement by Ambassador Richardson At Plenary on the Work of the Resumed Session, (Sept. 
15, 1978), Statement by Ambassador Richardson (Aug. 28, 1978) (unpublished) (copies 
available in the Boston College International and Comparative Law Review offices). For a full discussion 
of United States' interests, see Darman, supra note 63; see also Oxman, The Third United Nation's 
C07iference on the Law of the Sea: The 1977 New York Session 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 57 (1978); Oxman, 
supra note 2. 
85. Early bills on the subject included H.R. 13076, 92d Cong., lst Sess. (1972); H.R. 13904, 
92d Congo 1st Sess. (1972); and H.R. 14918, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1972). During the 92d, 93d 
and 94th Congressional Sessions, 16 days of hearings and five days of mark-up sessions were held 
in the House Subcommittee on Oceanography. H.REP. No. 1834, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 339 
(1979). 
86. At present three types of technology have been developed at great expense. These include 
the air lift, hydrolift, light media lift and mechanical lift such as the continuous line bucket system 
(CLB). Through companies such as Kennecott and other consortia, governments have poured 
vast sums of money into exploration and technological development. These include: I) in 
Australia, Australia's Bureau of Mineral Resources; 2) in France, CNEXO (government consor-
tium) and the French Atomic Energy Commission; 3) inJapan, Science and Technology Agency 
has subsidized Sumitomo Shoji and Sumitomo Shipbuilding and Machinery has also subsidized 
the Sumitomo group and the creation of Deep Ocean Mining Association (DOMA) a semi-public 
venture; 4) in the U.K., the Department of Trade and Industry has supported Rio Tinto Zinc 
and Consolidated Gold Fields of the Kennecott Group; 5) in the U.S., government activity has 
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1) it recognizes U.S. responsibilities under the concept that the 
resources of the seabed are the common heritage of mankind; 
2) it will be superseded whenever a law of the sea treaty takes effect 
with regard to the United States; 
3) it requires that revenues be set aside for developing countries; 
4-) it establishes stringent standards for the protection of the marine 
environment; 
5) it does not assert any right of sovereignty over seabed mine sites; 
and 
6) it does not declare or imply any intention that American seabed 
mining companies should remain outside the jurisdiction of an 
International Seabed Authority when an international treaty 
comes into being. 
The objective of the United States throughout the Law of the Sea negotia-
tions has been the achievement of a comprehensive treaty that protects the in-
terests of the United States as well as the interests of all the nations involved. 
The interests of the United States include assured access to seabed minerals. 
The United States has sought to create a parallel system of mining that would 
attract commercial investment, would be economically viable and would ac-
commodate the interests of the developing nations. The basic requirements of 
this system from the United States' point of view are that it should: 
1) ensure access and tenure by all qualified miners; 
2) set realistic production controls and financial arrangements; 
3) provide for transfer of technology under fair terms and condi-
tions; and 
4-) be administered by an international body that makes decisions 
recognizing the interests at stake in investment, production, and 
consumption. 87 
The sum of all of the other benefits88 that might be attainable by the Con-
been carried out by the Bureau of Mines, the U.S. Geological Survey, and the National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Agency. In addition to them, the U.S. National Science Foundation and the 
University of Hawaii have been included in nodule activity; 6) in the U.S.S.R., the Marine 
Geological Prospecting Board has carried out activities; 7) in the Federal Republic of Germany, 
the Federal Ministry for Education and Science has funded activities and the government has and 
continues to subsidize a joint venture of Pruessag, Mettallgesellschaft, Salzgitter, and Rhein-
braun known as the MAR group. The assistance provided by these governments is extensive 
ranging up to U.S. $3 million in lump sums and U.S. $700,000 annually. 1974 Report, supra note 
55 at 8-17. 
87. This discussion is drawn from various statements by Ambassador Richardson, supra note 
84 and the Congressional Hearings, supra note 83. 
88. These benefits include those related to navigation and other related uses, orderly manage-
ment of deep seabed on an international level, and the precedental effect for the development of 
global institutions for the increasing number of problems that require global treatment. For a 
discussion of these and other benefits, see Darman supra note 63. 
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ference are insufficient to outweigh the U.S. interests in an Authority that 
does not meet the above criteria. 
The negotiating realities reflect an extremely polarized situation: the 
United States and a few other industrialized countries on one side and the 
Group of 7789 on the other side. The Group of 77 has adopted a text of ex-
treme positions and related texts. A kind of informal unanimity exists among 
this group of some 110 to 120 nations which has the effect of giving veto power 
to a small group of influential extremists. It is the recognition of this North-
South block posturing that has seen the United States in 1978 come within a 
vote of getting the Deep Seabed Minerals Resources Act to tlre Senate floor. 90 
89. For a discussion of LDC voting behavior in the U.N. General Assembly see generally H. 
ALKER & B. RUSSET, WORLD POLITICS IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY (1965); Ball, Bloc Voting in the 
General Assembly, 5 INT'L ORG. 3 (1951); M. EL-KHAWAS, VOTING PATTERNS OF THE AFRICAN-
ASIAN GROUP: THEIR DEGREE OF COHESION IN THE U.N. FROM 1955 TO 1965 (1971); T. HOVET, 
BLOC POLITICS IN THE UNITED NATIONS (1958); T. HOVET, AFRICA IN THE UNITED NATIONS 
(1963); Lijphart, The Analysis of Bloc Voting in the General Assembly, 57 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 902 
(1963); Keohane, Political Influence in the General Assembly, INT'L CONCILIATION No. 557 (1966); R. 
RIGGS, POLITICS IN THE UNITED NATIONS: A STUDY OF UNITED STATES INFLUENCE IN THE 
GENERAL ASSEMBLY (1958); S. BAILY, THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OFTHE UNITED NATIONS (1964). 
On the general influence of the LDCs as a non-aligned group see Belovski, Influence of the Non-
Aligned on International Relations, 24 REV. INT'L AFF. (BELGRADE) 1 (1973); Ubani, Non-Alignment 
Defined, 25 REV. INT'LAFF. (BELGRADE) 7 (1975); Mirkovic, Non-Alignment and the Third World: A 
New Stimulusfrom Latin America, 24 REV. INT'L AFF. (BELGRADE) 7 (1973); Petkovic, Non-Alignment 
in Latin America, 21 REV. INT'L AFF. (BELGRADE) 8 (1970); Liska, The Rationale of Non-Alignment, in 
NEUTRALISM AND NON-ALIGNMENT 80 (L. Martin ed. 1962); Wilcox, The Non-Aligned States and 
the United Nations in NEUTRALISM AND NON-ALIGNMENT 121 (L. Martin ed. 1962). 
90. S. 2053, 95th Cong., lst Sess., Joint Hearings, supra note 83, at 4, is a bill to promote the 
orderly and environmentally sound exploration for and the commercial recovery of hard mineral 
resources of the deep seabed pending adoption of an international regime. The Deep Seabed 
Mineral Resources Act was not voted out of the Foreign Relations Committee, which means the 
legislative process must begin allover again in the 96th Congress. While both South Dakota 
senators have consistently opposed the deep seabed mining bill, Sen. George McGovern had 
voted for the version approved by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; Sen. Abourezk re-
jected it. Nautilus, OCEAN SCI. NEWS, Oct. 16, 1978, at 1-2. It appears that seabed mining pro-
ponents will move again in the next session to introduce the legislation. The bill met all the 
challenges of a substantive nature and it would have passed the Senate with only 20 or so dissent-
ing votes if it hadn't gotten hung up on a procedural matter with Sen. Abourezk. /d. 
The bill's passage in the next Congress is not assured. New members in the House and the 
Senate could change the picture. Nevertheless the seabed mining legis:lation received the ap-
proval of four different committees in the House and passed overwhelmingly the full test on the 
House floor by a vote of 312 to 80 on July 26, 1978. 124 CONGo REC. H7382 (daily ed. July 26, 
1978). 
There are a number of related bills in the House. H.R. 3350 and H.R. 4582, 95th Cong., lst 
Sess. (1977) are bills to promote the orderly development of hard mineral resources in the deep 
seabed pending adoption of an international regime. H.R. 3652, H.R. 4922, H.R. 5624, and 
H.R. 6846, 95th Congo 1st Sess. (1977) are bills to insure the development of U.S. ocean mining 
capabilities, and to support the continuance of the Law of the Sea negotiations. H.R. 6784, 95th 
Congo 1st Sess. (1978) is a bill to encourage an international regime to govern .. the uses of the 
oceans and their resources. Hearings, supra note 83, at I, 10, 17. H.R. 3350 was the bill that was 
passed by the House. 
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B. The Deep Seabed Minerals Act 
As the United States continues in its attempts to revise the negotiating text 
so that it provides assured access for nations and private companies under 
non-discriminatory conditions and under a United States' dominated Author-
ity, domestic interests91 have realized that the final agreement is years away. 
The legislation that has been created as a result of their efforts has seven major 
provisions, although the exact details of these bills vary slightly among the 
Committee versions and the House and Senate versions. 
First, the bills are transitional in nature and specifically denominate the 
desire of the United States for the achievement of a fair and effective Law of 
the Sea Agreement. They would merely establish a mechanism by which the 
United States will regulate its nationals who conduct seabed mining until an 
international system is created.92 No licenses or permits would be issued once 
such an international treaty becomes binding upon the United States. 93 
Second, U.S. nationals would not be permitted to engage in the exploration 
for or exploitation of manganese nodules on the deep seabed without a feder-
ally issued license or permit. 94 These permits would limit the area to be mined 
by one company. The versions of the bill adopted by the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee and the Senate Energy Committee would give this licensing 
power to the Secretary of the Interior95 while the Senate Commerce Commit-
tee version designates the Secretary of Commerce as the licensing authority. 96 
Third, the United States Government would guarantee reductions in a 
firm's investment caused by a future international agreement in varying 
degrees. The bill adopted by the Senate Energy Committee combines govern-
ment insurance provisions with voluntary insurance that would protect 
damages to a firm's investment for which it had no legal remediesY The ver-
sion of the bill recommended by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
91. The scope of this paper is limited to the mining interests. The most vocal industrial 
representatives are Lockheed Missles and Space Corp., INCO LTD., Kennecott Copper Corp., 
U.S. Steel Corp., SEDCO Inc., American Mining Congress, American Institute of Mining 
Underwriters, DeepSea Ventures, Earle V. Maynard Co., Standard Oil Co. of Indiana, and 
Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. Another domestic source of pressure is the Department of 
Defense. 
92. S. 2053, § 2(b)(I), (3), (3)(a)(I), in Joint Hearings, supra note 83, at 7-8. H.R. 3350, § 
2(b)(I), (3), in Hearings, supra note 83, at 2. 
93. S. 2053, § 102(C)(I)(a), inJoint Hearings, supra note 83, at 16 states that the Secretary may 
not issue' • Any license or permit after the date on which an international agreement pertaining to 
exploration and commercial recovery enters into force with respect to the United States, except to 
the extent that issuance of such license or permit is authorized by such agreement." 
94. /d., § 101; H.R. 3350, § 102(A)(I), 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONGo REC. H7343 (daily 
ed. July 26, 1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978 H.R. 3350j. 
95. S. 2053, § 4(13), in Joint Hearings, supra note 83, at 12. 
96. H.R. 3350, § 3(1), in Hearings, supra note 83, at 2 designates the Secretary of Commerce. 
97. S. 2053, § 202, inJoint Hearings, supra note 83, at 38; See S. REP., supra note 67, at 58-61 for 
a detailed examination of the Senate Ent'rgy Committee amendments. 
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deletes reference to investment guarantees and political risk insurance,98 in-
stead urging that U.S. negotiators make "good faith" efforts to obtain a 
grandfather clause for any miners that might engage in exploitation under the 
authority of this act. 99 The House bill is similar to the one recommended by 
the Foreign Relations Committee, substituting a statement of Congressional 
intent calling for the Law of the Sea Treaty to contain grandfather rights lOO 
stating: 
It is the intent of Congress -
(1) that any international agreement to which the United States 
becomes a party should, in addition to promoting other national 
oceans objectives -
(A) provide assured and nondiscriminatory access, under 
reasonable terms and conditions, to the hard mineral resources of 
the deep seabed for United States citizens, and 
(B) allow United States citizens who have undertaken exploration 
for, or commercial recovery of, hard mineral resources of the deep 
seabed under title I before such agreement enters into force with 
respect to the United States to continue their operations under 
similar terms, conditions, and restrictions as have been imposed on 
them under title I and any regulation issued thereunder, or other-
wise provide for the continuation of such operations in a manner 
that does not unreasonably impair the value of investments that have 
been made in relation to such operations. lol 
Fourth, the bills would authorize the Secretary of the licensing agency to 
designate a foreign nation as a reciprocating State for the purpose of pro-
moting the orderly development of the deep seabed resources. 102 They provide 
a procedure whereby the United States would recognize non-conflicting ap-
plications of foreign governments. 103 The House bill limits such reciprocal 
treatment to a nation that "has established a special fund for the payment of 
contributions to an international regime (established under an international 
agreement) for the sharing with the international community pursuant to such 
an agreement. "104 The President is given the power to revoke the designation 
98. Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), 22 U.S.C. §§ 2191-2200a (1976), as 
amended by OPIC Amendments Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-268, 92 Stat. 213. 
99. See S. REP. No. 1180, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) [hereinafter cited as Senate Report]. 
100. This type of a provision raises some constitutional questions: Can Congress interfere in 
this manner with treaty obligations? Furthermore, to what extent is this a promise that the Con-
gress will not ratify any treaty that does not contain these provisions? 
101. 1978 H.R. 3350, § 201, supra note 94, 124 CONGo REC. at H7345; id., § 202. 
102. S. 2053, §§6(12), 116, inJointHearings, supra note 83, at 12, 37; 1978H.R. 3350, § 107, 
supra note 94,124 CONGo REC. at H7345. See S. REP., supra note 67, at 43; NOVA, Cashing in on 
the Oceans 19 (1979) (transcript ofWGBH-TV telecast) (copy available in the Boston College Inter-
national and Comparative Law Review offices). 
103. !d. 
104. 1978 H.R. 3350, § 107(a)(5), supra note 94, 124 CONGo REC. at H7345. 
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of a foreign nation as a reciprocating State if he determines that "the foreign 
nation no longer complies with the requirements of subsection (a). "105 
Fifth, the legislation expresses serious concern that any activities in the deep 
seabed be carried out in accordance with careful concern for the environmen-
tal integrity of the deep seabed area. The approach in this respect has been to 
require the filing of an environmental impact statement,106 to require 
monitoring of activities in the area by the Environmental Protection 
Agency,107 and to make the approval of any application for a permit lOB a 
"major Federal action" for the purposes of the National Environmental 
Policy Act of 1969. 109 
Sixth, the legislation will establish a deepsea revenue sharing fund. 110 The 
House version would impose a 3.75 percent of the imputed value of the 
resource that is removed111 while one Senate version would levy a ten percent 
of the imputed value of the resource that is removed. 112 The creation of such a 
fund is an essential feature of seabed mineral legislation. It would demonstrate 
the support of the United States for the principle that commercial activity on 
the deep seabed should benefit all nations and be an expression of the fact that 
the United States is not seeking to undermine the concept of the "common 
heritage of mankind. "113 There would be created in the Treasury of the 
United States a trust fund designated as the "Deep Seabed Revenue Sharing 
Trust Fund" "of such amounts as may be appropriated or credited to the 
Trust Fund as provided in this section. "114 The Secretary of the Treasury is 
assigned management responsibilities for the fund. 115 If an agreement is 
reached on a Treaty within 10 years from the enactment of the bill then the 
105. ld., S 107(d). 
106. [d., § 105; S. 2053, S 109(c), in Joint Hearings, supra note 83, at 32. 
107. 1978 H.R. 3350, H 106(10), 105(3), supra note 94, 124 CONGo REC. at H7344; S. 2053, § 
109, in Joint Hearings, supra note 83, at 31. 
108. 1978 H.R. 3350, S 105(3)(b), supra note 94, 124 CONGo REC. at H7344; S. 2053, § 109(d), 
in Joint Hearings, supra note 83, at 32-33. 
109. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1976). 
110. 1978 H.R. 3350, § 401, supra note 94, 124 CONGo REC. at H7346 establishes a removal 
tax on seabed production and provides that revenues earned from the tax shall be contributed to a 
fund for distribution to the international community upon the entry into force of a Law of the Sea 
Treaty. The Senate Energy Committee version of S. 2053, § 203 calls for a study regarding the 
feasibility and desirability of revenue sharing. Senate Report, supra note 99, at 6. The Senate 
Commerce Committee version of S. 2053 deleted all reference to an international fund on the 
grounds that it is a tax issue and the Finance Committee has announced that it will be offering a 
floor amendment on this section. ld. 
111. 1978 H.R. 3350, § 401, supra note 94, 124 CONGo REC. at H7346. 
112. Suggested amendment to S. 2053, § 402, Senate Report, supra note 99, at 8-12. 
113. However this also serves as a final warning to the LOS Conference negotiators. The Con-
ference has 10 years to come with an acceptable agreement before the world community's interest 
in the deep seabed revenue sharing fund reverts back to the U.S. Treasury. 1978 H.R. 3350, § 
403(d), (e), supra note 94, 124 CONGo REC. at H7347. 
114. ld., § 403( a). These section references in notes 113 supra and 115 infra are the same for the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Amendment. Senate Report, supra note 99, at 9-11. 
115. 1978 H.R. 3350, § 403(c), supra note 94,124 CONGo REC. at H7347. 
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amounts in the Trust Fund shall be available, as provided by ap-
propriations Act for making contributions required under such 
treaty for purposes of the sharing among nations of the revenues 
from deep seabed mining. Nothing in this subsection shall be 
deemed to authorize any program or other activity not otherwise 
authorized by law. 116 
437 
If an agreement has not been reached within 10 years then the funds in the 
Trust Fund would be available for "such purposes as the Congress may 
hereafter provide by law." 117 
Seventh, the legislation is explicit in its disclaimer of sovereignty over the 
deep seabed. liB This is an important symbolic manifestation of the commit-
ment of the United States to the concept of the "common heritage of 
mankind." 
In addition to these seven major elements incorporated into the legislation 
there are other less significant elements that are present such as vessel 
documentation and build America provisionsll9 as well as domestic processing 
requirements. 120 
C. Summary 
To the extent that it attempted to introduce security for the consortia in-
volved to go ahead with exploration and exploitation, the legislation would 
have been successful. According to a major marine insurance underwriter in 
the field: 
As I would view the problem for ocean miners from an insurance 
point of view, industry is not concerned with the security of the in-
vestment involved with research and development, but is concerned 
with the prospective investment in the permanent plant, attendant 
machinery, and associated at sea mining and transportation 
systems. If they may be assured that there is no risk ofloss legally or 
politically to specified sites at which they actually have a legal claim, 
116. /d., S 403(d). 
117. Id., H03(e). 
118. /d., S 101(2); S. 2053, S 2(B), inJoint Hearings, supra note 83, at 7. 
119. S. 2053, S 102(c)(2), in Joint Hearings, supra note 83, at 17. As approved by the Senate 
Energy Committee the section requires permittees to use only mining and processing vessels that 
are documented under U.S. law or the law of reciprocating states. Senate Report, supra note 99, 
at 13. 1978 H.R. 3350, S 103(c)(2), supra note 94, 124 CONGo REC. at H7343 requires mining, 
processing and at least one transportation vessel to be U.S. documented. The Senate Commerce 
Committee amendments include the same vessel documentation requirements as id., S 103(c)(2) 
and in addition require that mining and processing vessels be constructed in the United States. 
Senate Report, supra note 99, at 13. 
120. Both the Senate Energy and Commerce Committees' versions ofS. 2053, S 102(c)(3), in 
Joint Hearings, supra note 83, at 17, require that all of the hard mineral resources recovered by 
each permittee be processed in the United States or aboard vessels documented under the laws of 
the United States unless a waiver is obtained. 1978 H.R. 3350, S 103(c)(5), supra note 94, 124 
CONGo REC. at H7343, requires the issuance of regulations on the location of processing plants 
which take into account various factors including the foreign policy interest of the United States. 
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they would be unconcerned with a risk of loss and thusly would not 
need insurance. If the treaty provides this security, we could 
eliminate this as a risk of loss. 
If through appropriate legislation, there is suitable indemnity for 
these risks of loss on the part of a stable government so that the risk 
of loss might be transferred to that political body, again there would 
be no need for insurance. 121 
By introducing this element of security122 the legislation has sought to prevent 
potential participants in the ocean mining industry from losing the desire to 
invest because of the ambiguous international situation relating to the 
development of the oceans and a law of the oceans. 123 Such a development also 
has the effect of solidifying the present advanced state of the technological 
capacity of American industry. 
The legislation further succeeds in attempting to implement the United 
Nations Law of the Sea Conference objective of recognizing the oceans as be-
ing the "common heritage of mankind" and to leave open the future possibil-
ity of achieving a comprehensive international accord. 124 Within this context 
the legislation also creates a mechanism to protect legitimate American in-
vestments made in advance of a subsequent Law of the Sea Treaty by pro-
viding for a system of insurance or calling for the United States to obtain a 
"grandfather clause" in the subsequent international agreement. 125 Finally 
there is ample expression of concern for the protection of the marine environ-
ment and a system to protect its integrity. 126 
121. Hearings, supra note 83, at 385-86 (statement of Earle V. Maynard, President, Earle V. 
Maynard & Co.). 
122. The question arises whether any multinational investing abroad in an extractive industry 
ever has "predictability of investment." Query whether OPIC, supra note 98, in fact provides 
any greater degree of risk insurance. See Beim, International Mining Projects: Risks and Rewards, 12 
J. INT'L L. & ECON. 209 (1978); Mays, Mineral Exploration and Production in Developing Countries: 
New Dimensions in OPIC's Assistance, 12 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 227 (1978); Heller, Political Risk In-
surance, 12 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 231 (1978). 
123. For testimony of representatives of the consortiums involved in deep seabed mining, see 
Joint Hearings, supra note 83, at 112-280. E.g., Phillip Hawkins, Vice-President of United States 
Steel, stated: 
The endorsement of the United States of a treaty based on the RSNT, the Engo, or 
the Evenson text would make it impossible to invest stockholders money in such a ven-
ture, or to represent to lending institutions that a project loan would be justified for the 
continuation of a deep sea mining program ... S. 2053, in general, states sound 
national policy. It might well be a stepping stone to reciprocal international legislation, 
a defacto treaty, based on sound principles. This legislation, which is premised on con-
tinuance of the freedom of the seas, imposes restrictions on the miner which do not now 
exist in that exercise of that freedom, but restrictions of this nature would be justifiable 
and acceptable if the deep sea miner were afforded in exchange the all important pre-
dictability of investment conditions and recognition of his rights covering a specific 
mine site. 
/d. at 213-14. See also Strauss, A View From Private Industry, 12 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 269 (1978); S. 
REP., supra note 67, at 43-49. 
124. See notes 1-10 supra and accompanying text. 
125. See note 101 supra and accompanying text. 
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V. SUMMARY 
A. Possibilities of Agreement and Compromise within the U. N. 
Law of the Sea Conference 
Many of the specific conditions for exploitation by enterprises remain to be 
delineated in the text of a future LOS agreement. The question arises as to 
whether they should be negotiated now or be determined by the Council and 
the Economic Planning Commission, Technical Commission, and the Rules 
and Regulations Commission later. Certainly, from the perspective of the 
mining companies with the technology necessary to begin exploitation, the 
prime prerequisites for actual mining operations are that they be granted ex-
clusive rights to and security of tenure in that area being exploited. These are 
the two aspects of legal security that the firms themselves have identified as 
essential. 127 These security elements have been dealt with in the present text to 
the satisfaction of these mining consortia. To keep the rest of the specific ques-
tions within the highly politicized realm of the negotiations is to invite a 
stalemate. To deal with them later in the functional forum of the three com-
missions of the Council is to seek a meaningful regime. 
Many of the problems with the various forms of text have been brought out 
in other forums. 128 They include such matters as the relationship of the Inter-
national Authority's Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber129 with the Tribunal 
established for the entire IC NT. 130 In this respect the Group of 77 has ex-
pressed the view that the Authority's Chamber should have jurisdiction only 
over contractual matters. Other possible contentious issues remain for the 
future, e.g., which 18 members of the Council will be elected for short terms 
initially and which of the four judges of the Tribunal will be appointed for 
short terms. 
It can also be anticipated that there will be a great deal of political infighting 
and jockeying for positions on the independently selected Economic Planning 
Commission, Technical Commission, and the Rules and Regulations Com-
mission. While this may occur, as it does for positions on the staff of the 
United Nations Secretariat, there is no reason to believe that the members, 
once selected, will be any less independent of their states of nationality and 
functionally effective than their Secretariat staff counterparts. In this relatively 
depoliticized atmosphere of "technocrats" the aforementioned procedural 
details can be worked out with greater effectiveness and in a more rational 
atmosphere. 
126. See notes 106-108 supra. 
127. See note 121 supra. 
128. See, e.g., Oxman, supra note 7; Geneva Session, supra note 7; Caracas, supra note 7; Stevenson 
& Oxman, supra note 7. 
129. leNT, supra note 1, arts. 187-192. 
130. ld., Annex V. 
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The more substantive areas of conflict, such as the method of voting in the 
Council, are still contentious and must be reconciled before agreement can be 
reached. Several alternatives for voting procedure exist that would not involve 
substantial concessions by any of the dominant actors. It would not be 
necessary for the United States to insist that there be a veto power in the 
Council. One alternative proposal calls for the establishment of a consumer 
and a producer group within the Council. Each group would vote separately 
with majority approval required from each group on substantive questions. 
Another proposal would offer a weighted voting system patterned after the 
voting weights on the Governing Board of the International Energy 
Agency.131 Each member is assigned a constant number which would be 
augmented by an additional figure based on oil consumption. In the Author-
ity's Council this "weight" might be determined by the relative degrees of 
consumption and production of the minerals involved. Under such a scheme 
those countries with a greater national interest from the standpoint of produc-
tion or consumption would have an input into policy-making proportionate to 
that interest. 
With regard to the question of the minimization of the economic implica-
tions, another possible solution, in addition to compensatory financing, pro-
duction controls or price controls, would have the advantage of being more 
selective in its impact. This proposal would be directed at offsetting the effect 
of higher prices arising from the implementation of anyone of the three 
mechanisms. Essentially, it would allow the Enterprise to offer its mineral pro-
duction from the seabed exploitation to be sold to the "fourth world" LDCs at 
lower prices than the prevailing international market price established by the 
Authority. 
B. Prospects for Agreement 
Perhaps the strongest motive for some form of accord is the consequences of 
no agreement. Despite the controversy over the delimitation of national 
jurisdiction under the "exploitability criterion" of Article 1 of the Geneva 
Convention on the Continental Shelf,132 it seems likely that, because of the 
131. See Willrich & Conant, The International Energy Agency: An Interpretation and Assessment, 71 
AM.]. INT'L L. 199 (1977); Woodliffe, A New Dimension to International Cooperation: The OEeD In-
ternational Energy Agreement, 24 INT'L & COMPo L. Q. 525 (1975); see also the International Coffee 
Agreement, [1975]27 U.S.T. 1655, T.I.A.S. No. 8277. 
132. Article 1 states "the shelf may extend beyond the continental terrace, but such an exten-
sion or any extension beyond the 200 meter depth depends for its validity upon proof of ex-
ploitability." Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, [1958]15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 
5578, 5639. How far seaward this "exploitability" may go has been the subject of controversy. 
The International Court of]ustice has emphasized in at least two cases, the Norwegian Fisheries 
Case in 1951, Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway), [1951] IC] 116, and the North Sea 
Continental Shelf Cases, (Germany v. l)enmark; Germany v. Netherlands) [1969] I.C.]. 1, that 
the continental shelf is a natural prolongation of the land of the coastal state. The implication 
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vested interests represented in the large financial outlays that have occurred in 
six or seven industrialized nations, 133 certain nations will be forced to go ahead 
unilaterally, or multilaterally, with the exploitation of the deep seabed. The 
United States is particularly poised to go ahead under such conditions as this 
Comment has pointed out. l34 
The impact of such unilateral and relatively unbridled deep seabed exploita-
tion would be as follows: 1) the LDCs would be unable, for technological and 
financial reasons, to enter into the competition for deep seabed exploitation; 2) 
there would be an increasing disparity of GNP between the "rich and the 
poor" as the benefits of such exploitation would accrue solely to certain in-
dustrialized states unless a voluntary system of redistribution was established; 
and 3) the economic impact of unregulated production would have a depress-
ing effect on international price schedules as the new sources of supply entered 
the market. 
In addition to the potential increase in the gap between the LDCs and the 
DCs that could result from exploitation in the absence of an international 
regime, the rapid technological development of the mining operations for the 
deep seabed will result in increasing amounts of pressure being brought to 
bear on national governments, and in the rapid intensification of vested in-
terests having a stake in the continued absence of an international regime. If 
technological developments and North-South tensions move ahead too 
rapidly, they may preclude the possibility of political agreement on the ques-
tion of an international regime. Once the faits accomplis of actual exploitation 
of the deep seabed has occurred, the situation acquires an entir~ly new mise en 
scene. 135 
Allowing unilateral exploitation would effectively outlaw the regulation and 
order that could be provided by an international regime. The absence of an 
here is that' 'exploitability" would not result in a totally elastic expansion or extension of the con-
tinental shelf and that there is a point at which it cannot be considered a natural extension of the 
land or close to its shores. One possibility in this regard is that the U.N. General Assembly re-
quest an Advisory Opinion from the Court on the legality of unilateral exploitation of the deep 
seabed. 
133. See note 9 supra. 
134. Clearly, this writer feels that the United States has conceded to the LDC demands as far 
as it should from a U.S. foreign policy perspective. The foreign policy of the United States has 
been passive for the past five years. The retrenchment of post-Watergate U.S. foreign policy was 
commented on regarding Iran in Editorial, A Revolution that Keeps Rolling On, Manchester Guard-
ian, Mar. 18, 1979, at 10, col. 3. The LOS area provides a functional non-risk situation to assert 
its power in the world arena if the LDCs do not manifest a willi~gness to compromise in the 
Spring 1979 LOS Conference. 
135. This problem is discussed by Adoph Berle in connection with the 1944 Chicago Civil 
Aviation Ccnvention who writes: "By the time the world attempted to come to grips with the 
problem of civilian air use, the whole question had already been complicated by a series of na-
tionalistic legal claims, similar to the claims now being advanced in connection with the seabed." 
Berle, Analogies Between Enterprise Activities in Airspace and in the Oceans, in 4 PACEM IN MARIBUS 93 
(E. H. Burnell & Van Simson eds. 1971). 
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agreement on an international legal structure and set of norms throws future 
development to the winds of fate and effectively allows a de facto monopoly by 
the "haves." It leaves the less technologically advanced nations without the 
chance of participating in seabed exploitation. One writer who has examined 
this relationship of these factors in depth concludes: 
The clarification of the creeping shelf boundary, of the potential 
challenges to investment in "hot spot" areas, of the multiple uses 
conflicts and safety problems arising therefrom, and of the continued 
erosion of the freedom of the seas are directly related to the widening 
gap between the northern and southern halves of the globe and 
developments in ocean technology. By "waiting and seeing" we are, 
therefore, not only accepting the build-up of international tensions, 
we are also accepting as faits accomplis both good and bad 
technological and economic changes. This means, in fact, that we 
accede to the time scale and decisions made by the stipulators and 
appliers of scientific and technological innovators, who are not 
necessarily exponents of an international social conscience. 136 
VI. CONCLUSION 
It appears to be in the self-interest of the LDCs to get some form of agree-
ment on an international regime, even if it does not meet their maximum 
demands. It certainly makes good sense to take an uncompromising position 
in attempting to achieve one's demands but, it makes more sense to realize 
when a position is unattainable and to salvage whatever is possible. 
Thus far in the negotiations the LDCs, in the form of the Group of 77, have 
met with a fair degree of success in pressing their demands. This must not pro-
hibit agreement based upon some concessions on their part. Whether their ex-
pressed intransigence is a bargaining ploy, or if it is sincere, will be revealed at 
the conclusion of the Conference. One hopes that their realization of the situa-
tion is more sophisticated than it appears. They stand the most to lose from the 
unilateral exploitation of the seabed that will occur if an international regime 
is not agreed upon. It is in their self-interest, as well as in the interest of the 
progressive development of international law, to reach an agreement based 
upon mutual consensus and compromise. Presently, the United States is ready 
to go ahead unilaterally. 
A final factor that remains to be mentioned concerns the susceptability to 
change of the concluded agreement. Once the ICNT has come into force it 
136. Vitzhum. Legal Questions of Marine Mining: The Shelf Principle, Technology, and the North-South 
Split in 2 PACEM IN MARIBUS. 79-80 (E. H. Burnell & Van Simson eds. 1971). 
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does not suddenly become immune to change and adaptability. 137 Indeed, it is 
precisely its susceptability to change and adaptation to new conditions that will 
enable it to rank high in the attempts of mankind to formulate international 
order and to foster and stimulate the functional development of international 
law. 138 In the long run its structures may not survive completely intact but, as 
a manifestation of a crucial conceptualization that wields the potential to 
radically alter the development of global society, it will loom as the first and 
unique attempt at a social experiment designed to put decision-making and 
sovereignty over natural resources into the hands of the global community. 139 
Robert Everett Bostrom 
137. Indeed, the text of the ICNT specifically calls for a review conference. ICNT, supra note 
1, art. 153. The problem here is that if the conference is deadlocked after 5 years the Assembly 
would have the power to impose a moratorium on new contracts and plans for the work of the 
Enterprise. S. REP .. supra note 67, at 46-48. 
138. That present attempts at treaties arising out of the universal legislative process are but 
important first steps in the process is noted by Richard Kearney and Robert Dalton in their com-
mentary on the Vienna Convention on Treaties: "One substantial achievement is the provision 
of a mechanism to adjust the conflicting demands between the forces of stability and change .... 
The treaty on treaties does not approach perfection. The international legislative process remains 
much too primitive a mechanism to produce an approach to perfection. This convention is, 
however, in an unspectacular and earthbound way, a giant step for mankind toward a world in 
which the rule of law will be not a dream but a reality." Kearney & Dalton, The Treaty on Treaties, 
64 AM]. INT'L L. 495, 561 (1970). 
139. Attempts are being considered for the natural resources of the Antarctic. See Comment, 
Survival oj the Antarctic Treaty: Economic Self-Interest v. Enlightened International Cooperation, 2 B.C. 
INT'L & COMPo L.]. 115, 127-28 (1978). Recent concern over air pollution in the Arctic that 
eminates from industrialized nations underscores another area which requires global cooperation 
in an international organization. Sullivan, European Smog Linked to Mysterious Arctic Haze, N. Y. 
Times, Feb. 18, 1979, at 18, col. I. The real answer, and it may be unattainable because of an 
impasse in LOS negotiations, is a dialogue which recognizes the interdependence of LDCs and 
DCs and seeks to establish principles that assure functional cooperation in an area of functional 
need. 
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